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1. INTRODUCTION
In the last years, significant effort has been devoted to bring the vision of a Semantic
Web closer to reality. Adopting a layered architecture, a number of building blocks
have been proposed that serve different purposes, from low-level data encoding to
high-level semantic representation. In this architecture, the building blocks for
ontologies, rules, and query languages play a prominent role. Furthermore, to
ensure interoperability and wide applicability, standard representation formalisms
are propagated by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), including the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) [RDF Concepts 2004; RDF Semantics 2004], the
Web Ontology Language (OWL) [OWL Semantics 2004; OWL 2 2009], and the
recent Rule Interchange Format Basic Logic Dialect (RIF BLD) [RIF BLD 2009].
In addition, the RIF logical framework [Kifer 2008] lays the foundation for Web
rule languages extending RIF BLD with nonmonotonic negation.
Each of these formalisms has a formal semantics, which is either expressible
in terms of classical logic or logic programming [de Bruijn and Heymans 2007;
Horrocks and Patel-Schneider 2003; Kifer 2008]. There is a need for combining
these formalisms, which is illustrated by the following simple example.
Example 1.1. RDF is the basic data description language of the Semantic Web.
Atomic statements (triples) in RDF are of the form (subject, predicate, object).
Subjects and objects, which may be resources on the Web (denoted by URIs), may
be shared between triples, yielding a graph-based data model. As demonstrated by
de Bruijn and Heymans [2007], the semantics of RDF [RDF Semantics 2004] can
be captured in first-order logic, in terms of a formula where sets of such triples are
expressed as conjunctions of facts. For purposes of illustration and compatibility
with description logics (DL), we use here a simplified notation for RDF triples where
class membership (rdf:type) statements are represented using unary predicates, and
all other statements using binary predicates. For a full encoding of RDF in first-
order logic, de Bruijn and Heymans [2007] use a ternary predicate triple to represent
all RDF statements (see also Section 7.2).
Consider a fictitious Web site gangsterepics.com that publishes information
about gangster movies:
∃x.title(TheGodFather, “The Godfather”)∧
title(TheGodFather2, “The Godfather: Part II”)∧
title(PulpFiction, “Pulp Fiction”)∧ director(PulpFiction, quentinTarantino)∧
director(TheGodFather, x)∧ director(TheGodFather2, x)∧
mentionedAt(PulpFiction, gangsterepics.com)∧
mentionedAt(TheGodFather, gangsterepics.com)∧
mentionedAt(TheGodFather2, gangsterepics.com)
The creator of the page did not know the director of “The Godfather” movies,
but wanted to express the fact that both parts had the same director. To this
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end, he used an existentially quantified variable, called “blank node” in RDF. RDF
Schema [2004] and OWL have the possibility to express structural relations be-
tween predicates. For instance, an OWL (DL) ontology stating that all the movies
mentioned at gangsterepics.com are either epics or gangster movies, and that
director is the inverse of directorOf can be expressed in terms of DL axioms
∃mentionedAt .{gangsterepics.com} ⊑ Epic ⊔GangsterMovie ,
director− ≡ directorOf ,
which may be viewed as a set of first-order logic sentences
∀x.mentionedAt(x, gangsterepics.com) ⊃ (Epic(x) ∨GangsterMovie(x)),
∀x, y.director (x, y) ≡ directorOf (y, x).
Apart from classical first-order statements, it may be useful to express nonmono-
tonic information, e.g., that any gangster movie not mentioned on gangsterepics.
com is an independent movie. For such nonmonotonic statements, logic program-
ming based rules languages that include negation are better suited. That is, we
may use the following rule:
IndieMovie(x)← GangsterMovie(x), not mentionedAt(x, gangsterepics.com).
Consider now the following query, which asks for all directors, using the directorOf
predicate, written using Datalog notation:
answer(x)← directorOf (y, x).
Answering such a query essentially depends on how to interpret and formally com-
bine data (RDF), ontologies (OWL), and rule bases. Given that each of these parts
is expressible as either a classical first-order theory or a logic program, the question
is how to combine logic programs and classical first-order theories in a unifying
logical framework.
A combination of this kind is not obvious, due to the very different setting of
classical logic and logic programming [de Bruijn et al. 2006; Motik et al. 2006],
and many proposals for combination have been made (we review several of them
in Sections 7 and 9). Like in the previous example, an ontology in the form of
a classical theory1 and a logic program should be viewed as complementary de-
scriptions of the same domain. Therefore, a separation between predicates defined
in these two components should not be enforced. Furthermore, it is desirable to
neither restrict the interaction between the classical and the rules components nor
to impose syntactic or semantic restrictions on the individual components. That is,
the classical component may be an arbitrary theory Φ of some first-order language
with equality, and the rules component may be an arbitrary non-ground normal or
disjunctive logic program P , interpreted using, e.g., the common stable model se-
mantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; 1991].2 The goal is a combined theory, ι(Φ, P ),
1While ontologies are not always first-order definable, for the purpose of this paper we confine
ourselves to such ontologies. We note that the Semantic Web ontology languages are first-order
definable [Sattler et al. 2003].
2For computational reasons, such restrictions (e.g., DL-safety) may be imposed, cf. Sections 7 and
9.
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in a uniform logical formalism. Naturally, this theory should amount to Φ if P is
empty, and to P if Φ is empty. Therefore, such a combination must provide faithful
embeddings σ(Φ) and τ(P ) of Φ and P , respectively, such that σ(Φ) = ι(Φ, ∅) and
τ(P ) = ι(∅, P ). In turn, knowledge combination may be carried out on top of σ(·)
and τ(·), where in the simplest case one may choose ι(Φ, P ) = σ(Φ) ∪ τ(P ).
This raises the following questions: (a) which uniform formalism is suitable and
(b) which embeddings are suitable and, furthermore, how do potentially suitable
embeddings relate to each other and behave under knowledge combination?
Concerning the first question, Motik and Rosati [2007] use a variant of Lifschitz’s
bimodal nonmonotonic logic of minimal knowledge and negation-as-failure (MKNF)
[Lifschitz 1991]. While the proposed embeddings of the first-order (FO) theory and
the logic program are both faithful in the sense described above, the particular com-
bination proposed by Motik and Rosati is only one among many possible methods
and MKNF is only one possible underlying formalism for such combinations (we
discuss these issues in more detail in Section 8). Indeed, de Bruijn et al. [2007] use
quantified equilibrium logic (QEL) [Pearce and Valverde 2005] as a host formalism.
Unlike Motik and Rosati, de Bruijn et al. do not propose a new semantics for com-
binations, but rather show that QEL can capture the semantics of combinations
by Rosati [2006] and can be used, for example, to define notions of equivalence of
combinations.
Autoepistemic logic (AEL) [Moore 1985], which extends classical logic with a
single nonmonotonic modal belief operator, being essentially the nonmonotonic
variant of the modal logic kd45 [Shvarts 1990; Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1993], is
an attractive candidate for serving as a uniform host formalism for combinations.
Compared to other well-known nonmonotonic formalisms, like Reiter’s default logic
[Reiter 1980], FO-AEL offers a uniform language in which (nonmonotonic) rules
themselves can be expressed at the object level. This conforms with the idea of
treating an ontology and a logic program together as a unified theory. Further-
more, in FO-AEL we can decide, depending on the context, whether (the negation
of) a particular atomic formula should be interpreted nonmonotonically simply by
including a modal operator. This enables us to use the same predicate in both
a monotonic and a nonmonotonic context. This is in contrast to circumscription
[McCarthy 1986], in which one has to decide, for the entire theory, which predicates
are to be minimized.
Embedding a classical theory in AEL is trivial, and several embeddings of logic
programs in AEL have been described [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Marek and
Truszczynski 1993; Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993; Chen 1993; Przymusinski 1991a].
However, they all have been developed for the propositional case only, whereas
we need to deal with non-ground theories and programs. This requires us to con-
sider first-order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) [Konolige 1991; Kaminski and Rey
2002; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2000], and non-ground versions of these embeddings.
We consider the semantics for FO-AEL as defined by Konolige [1991], because it
faithfully extends first-order logic with equality (other variants are discussed in
Section 8).
Motivated by these issues, our contribution in this paper is twofold:
(1) We define several embeddings of non-ground logic programs into FO-AEL,
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taking into account subtle issues of quantification in FO-AEL. In more detail, we
present three embeddings, τHP , τEB , and τEH , for normal logic programs which ex-
tend respective embeddings for the propositional case [Gelfond 1987; Gelfond and
Lifschitz 1988; Marek and Truszczynski 1993; Chen 1993; Lifschitz 1994], and three
embeddings, τ∨HP , τ
∨
EB, and τ
∨
EH , for disjunctive logic programs, where τ
∨
HP and
τ∨EH extend embeddings considered in the ground case [Przymusinski 1991a; Marek
and Truszczynski 1993]. We show that all these embeddings are faithful in the
sense that the stable models of the logic program P and the sets of objective ground
atoms in the stable expansions of the embeddings τχ(P ) (χ ∈ {HP ,EB ,EH }) are in
a one-to-one correspondence (Theorem 5.3). However, the embeddings behave dif-
ferently on formulas beyond ground atoms, in some cases already for simple ground
formulas. This, in turn, may impact the behavior of the embeddings when used
in combinations of logic programs and classical theories. This raises the question
under which conditions the embeddings differ and under which conditions they cor-
respond. Of particular interest for knowledge combination is how these embeddings
behave relatively to each other in combinations with classical theories.
(2) To answer these questions, we conduct two comparative studies of the be-
havior of the various embeddings. We consider three classes of programs: ground,
safe, and arbitrary logic programs under the stable model semantics.
(a) We first determine correspondences between the stable expansions of differ-
ent embeddings τχ beyond ground atomic formulas (Propositions 5.5-5.9), and
present inclusion relations between the sets of consequences of the embeddings
(Theorems 5.14 and 5.15). These results already allow to draw a few conclusions
on the behavior of embeddings in combinations.
(b) We then determine correspondences between stable expansions for combina-
tions of logic programs with classical theories. Here, we take the shape of the logic
program, the shape of the classical theory, and the type of formulas of interest
for the correspondence into account. To this end, we consider different fragments
of classical logic that are important for knowledge representation, including Horn,
universal, and generalized Horn theories. The latter are of particular interest for
ontologies, since they essentially include RDF Schema [de Bruijn and Heymans
2007], Horn-SHIQ [Hustadt et al. 2005], and the OWL 2 profiles QL, RL, and EL
[OWL 2 Profiles 2009]; furthermore, they essentially include also Tuple Generating
Dependencies [Abiteboul et al. 1995], which are a popular class of constraints in
databases. Our main result for embeddings in combinations (Theorem 6.2) gives a
complete picture of the correspondences, which reveals that they behave differently
in general, and shows the restrictions on the program or theory that give rise to
correspondence.
The results of these studies not only deepen the understanding of the individual
embeddings, but also have practical implications with respect to their use. They
tell us in which situations one embedding may be used instead of another.
Noticeably, the embeddings of logic programs we study can be seen as building
blocks for actual combinations of a classical theory Φ and a logic program P . The
most straightforward combination is ι(Φ, P ) = σ(Φ) ∪ τχ(P ), where σ is the iden-
tity mapping and τχ is one of the embeddings we consider. One could also imagine
adding axioms to, or changing axioms in Φ; similarly, rules could be changed in,
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or added to P before translating them (e.g., grounding rules as customary in logic
programming). If Φ′ and P ′ are the thus obtained classical theory and logic pro-
gram, our results are still applicable to the combination ι′(Φ, P ) = Φ′ ∪ τχ(P ′).
In fact, whenever the combination is of the form Φ′ ∪ τχ(P ′), regardless of Φ and
P , the correspondences and differences between the embeddings we establish hold.
Furthermore, the effect of different program rewritings P ′ in combinations may be
assessed.
To illustrate the use of our results, we show applications to the Semantic Web.
More specifically, we show that the semantics of existing combinations of ontologies
and rules in this context can be captured, and that via our correspondence result
properties of the semantics can be derived, as well as their behavior in other (modi-
fied) combinations. Finally we show how the embeddings we consider can be used to
extend combinations to richer languages, particularly extensions of rule languages
with nonmonotonic negation. However, while we focus here on the Semantic Web,
applications in other contexts (e.g., data modeling languages like UML plus OCL)
might be explored.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review the definitions
of first-order logic and logic programs in Section 2. We proceed to describe first-
order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) and present a novel characterization of stable
expansions for certain kinds of theories in Section 3. The embeddings of normal and
disjunctive logic programs and our results about faithfulness of the embeddings are
described in Section 4. We investigate the relationships between the embeddings
themselves, and under combination with first-order theories, in Sections 5 and 6.
We discuss applications to the Semantic Web in Section 7 and further implications
in Section 8. We discuss related work in Section 9, and conclude and outline future
work in Section 10. Proofs of the results in Sections 5 and 6 can be found in the
appendix.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let us briefly recapitulate some basic elements of first-order logic and logic programs
as well as some relevant notation.
2.1 First-Order Logic
We consider first-order logic with equality. A language L is defined over a signature
Σ = (F ,P), where F and P are countable sets of function and predicate symbols,
respectively. Function symbols with arity 0 are also called constants. Furthermore,
V is a countably infinite set of variables. Terms and atomic formulas (atoms) are
constructed as usual. Ground terms are also called names ; NΣ denotes the set of
names of a given signature Σ. Complex formulas are constructed as usual using
the primitive symbols ¬, ∧, ∃, ‘(’, and ‘)’. As usual, φ∨ψ is short for ¬(¬φ ∧¬ψ),
φ ⊃ ψ is short for ¬φ∨ψ, and ∀x.φ(x) is short for ¬∃x.¬φ(x). We sometimes write
t1 6= t2, where t1 and t2 are terms, as an abbreviation for ¬(t1 = t2). The universal
closure of a formula φ is denoted by (∀) φ. Lg is the restriction of L to ground
formulas and Lga is the restriction of Lg to atomic formulas. An FO theory Φ ⊆ L
is a set of closed formulas, i.e., every variable is bound by a quantifier.
An interpretation of a language L is a tuple w = 〈U, ·I〉, where U is a nonempty
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set, called the domain, and ·I is a mapping which assigns to every n-ary function
symbol f ∈ F a function f I : Un → U and to every n-ary predicate symbol p ∈ P
a relation pI ⊆ Un. A variable assignment B for w is a mapping that assigns to
every variable x ∈ V an element xB ∈ U . A variable assignment B′ is an x-variant
of B if yB = yB
′
for every variable y ∈ V such that y 6= x. The interpretation of a
term t, denoted tw,B, is defined as usual; if t is ground, we sometimes write tw.
We call an individual k named if there is some name t ∈ N such that tw = k,
and unnamed otherwise. Interpretations are named if all individuals are named.
We say that the unique names assumption applies to an interpretation if all names
are interpreted distinctly, and we say that the standard names assumption applies
if, in addition, the interpretation is named.3
A name substitution β is a partial function that assigns variables in V names from
N ; we also write x/β(x) for (x, β(x)). As usual, β is total if its domain is V . Given a
variable assignment B for an interpretation w, we define the set of named variables
in B as V w,BN = {x | x
B is named}. A substitution β is associated with B if its
domain is V w,BN and x
B = β(x)w , for each x ∈ V w,BN . The application of a name
substitution β to some term, formula, or theory χ, denoted by χβ, is defined as
syntactical replacement, as usual. Clearly, if the unique names assumption applies,
each variable assignment has a unique associated substitution; if the standard names
assumption applies, each associated substitution is total.
Example 2.1. Consider a language L with constants F = {a, b, c}, and an inter-
pretation w = 〈U, ·I〉 with U = {k, l,m} such that aw = k, bw = l, and cw = l, and
the variable assignment B: xB = k, yB = l, and zB = m. B has two associated
name substitutions, β1 = {x/a, y/b} and β2 = {x/a, y/c}, which are both not total.
2.2 Logic Programs
A disjunctive logic program P consists of rules of the form
h1 | . . . | hl ← b1, . . . , bm, not c1, . . . , not cn (1)
where h1, . . . , hl, b1, . . . , bm, c1, . . . , cn are equality-free atoms, with m,n ≥ 0 and
l ≥ 1. H(r) = {h1, . . . , hl} is the set of head atoms of r, B+(r) = {b1, . . . , bm} is
the set of positive body atoms of r, and B−(r) = {c1, . . . , cn} is the set of negated
body atoms of r. If l = 1, then r is normal. If B−(r) = ∅, then r is positive. If
every variable in r occurs in B+(r), then r is safe. If every rule r ∈ P is normal
(resp., positive, safe), then P is normal (resp., positive, safe).
Each program P has a signature ΣP , which contains the function and predicate
symbols that occur in P . We assume that ΣP contains some 0-ary function symbol
if it has predicate symbols of arity greater than 0. With LP we denote the first-
order language over ΣP . As usual, Herbrand interpretations M of P are subsets of
the set of ground atoms of LP .
The grounding of a logic program P , denoted gr(P ), is the union of all possible
ground instantiations of P , obtained by replacing each variable in a rule r with a
name in NΣP , for each rule r ∈ P .
3We note here that the term “standard names assumption” is used with various slightly different
meanings in the literature; see Section 8 for further discussion.
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Let P be a positive program. A Herbrand interpretation M of P is a Herbrand
model of P if, for every rule r ∈ gr(P ), B+(r) ⊆M implies H(r)∩M 6= ∅, and, for
every t ∈ NΣP , t = t ∈ M . A Herbrand model M is minimal iff for every model
M ′ such that M ′ ⊆M , M ′ =M .
Following Gelfond and Lifschitz [1991], the reduct of a logic program P with
respect to an interpretation M , denoted PM , is obtained from gr(P ) by deleting
(i) each rule r with B−(r)∩M 6= ∅ and (ii) not c from the body of every remaining
rule r with c ∈ B−(r). If M is a minimal Herbrand model of PM , then M is a
stable model of P .
Example 2.2. Consider the program
P = {p(a); p(b); q(x) | r(x)← p(x), not s(x)}
and the interpretation M1 = {p(a), p(b), q(a), r(b)}.4 The reduct
PM1 = {p(a); p(b); q(a) | r(a)← p(a); q(b) | r(b)← p(b)}
has M1 as a minimal model, thus M1 is a stable model of P . The other stable
models of P are M2 = {p(a), p(b), q(a), q(b)}, M3 = {p(a), p(b), q(b), r(a)}, and
M4 = {p(a), p(b), r(a), r(b)}.
3. FIRST-ORDER AUTOEPISTEMIC LOGIC
We adopt first-order autoepistemic logic (FO-AEL) under the any- and all-name
semantics of Konolige [1991]. These semantics allow quantification over arbitrary
domains and generalize classical first-order logic with equality, thereby allowing
a trivial embedding of first-order theories (with equality). Other approaches like
those by Kaminski and Rey [2002] or Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] require in-
terpretations to follow the unique or standard names assumptions and therefore do
not allow such direct embeddings.
An FO-AEL language LL is defined relative to a first-order language L by allowing
the unary modal operator L in the construction of formulas—Lφ is usually read as
“φ is known” or “φ is believed”. As usual, closed formulas, i.e., formulas without
free variable occurrences, are called sentences ; formulas of the form Lφ, where φ is a
formula, aremodal atoms; and L-free formulas are objective. Standard autoepistemic
logic is variable-free FO-AEL.
To distinguish between semantic notions defined for the any- resp. all-name se-
mantics, we use the symbols E (“Existence of name”) and A (“for All names”).
An autoepistemic interpretation is a pair 〈w,Γ〉, where w = 〈U, ·I〉 is a first-order
interpretation and Γ ⊆ LL is a set of sentences, called a belief set. Satisfaction of
a formula Lφ in an interpretation 〈w,Γ〉 with respect to a variable assignment B
under the any-name semantics, denoted (w,B) |=EΓ Lφ, is defined as
(w,B) |=EΓ Lφ iff, for some name substitution β associated with B, φβ is closed
and φβ ∈ Γ.
Satisfaction of arbitrary formulas is then as follows, where φ, ψ ∈ LL:
—(w,B) |=EΓ p(t1, . . . , tn) iff (t
w,B
1 , . . . , t
w,B
n ) ∈ p
I ;
4For brevity, we leave out equality atoms in the example.
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—(w,B) |=EΓ t1 = t2 iff t
w,B
1 = t
w,B
2 ;
—(w,B) |=EΓ ¬φ iff (w,B) 6|=
E
Γ φ;
—(w,B) |=EΓ φ ∧ ψ iff (w,B) |=
E
Γ φ and (w,B) |=
E
Γ ψ;
—(w,B) |=EΓ ∃x.φ iff for some x-variant B
′ of B, (w,B′) |=EΓ φ.
An interpretation 〈w,Γ〉 is a model of φ, denoted w |=EΓ φ, if (w,B) |=
E
Γ φ for every
variable assignment B for w. This extends to sets of formulas in the usual way.
A set of formulas Φ ⊆ LL entails a formula φ ∈ LL with respect to a belief set Γ,
denoted Φ |=EΓ φ, if for every interpretation w such that w |=
E
Γ Φ, w |=
E
Γ φ.
The notions of satisfaction and entailment under the all-name semantics, for
which we use the symbol |=AΓ , are analogous, with the only difference that satisfac-
tion of modal atoms is defined as
(w,B) |=AΓ Lφ iff, for all name substitutions β associated with B, φβ is closed
and φβ ∈ Γ.
Note that the any- and all-name semantics always coincide for objective formu-
las and, if the unique (or standard) names assumption applies, also for arbitrary
formulas in LL; this was also observed by Kaminski and Rey [2002]. In such situ-
ations, i.e., where both semantics coincide, we sometimes use |=Γ rather than |=EΓ
or |=AΓ . Furthermore, when talking about entailment Φ |=Γ φ under the standard
names assumption, we mean entailment considering only interpretations for which
the standard names assumption holds. That is, Φ |=Γ φ under the standard names
assumption if for every interpretation w such that the standard names assumption
applies in w and w |=Γ Φ, w |=Γ φ.
Example 3.1. Consider the formula φ = ∀x(p(x) ⊃ Lp(x)) and some interpre-
tation 〈w,Γ〉. Then, w |=EΓ φ iff, for every variable assignment B, (w,B) |=
E
Γ
p(x) ⊃ Lp(x), which in turn holds iff (w,B) 6|=EΓ p(x) or (w,B) |=
E
Γ Lp(x). Now,
(w,B) |=EΓ Lp(x), with x
B = k, iff, for some t ∈ NΣ, tw = k, and p(t) ∈ Γ. Thus, φ
is false (unsatisfied) in any interpretation where pI contains unnamed individuals.
Analogous for the all-name semantics.
The following example illustrates the difference between the any- and all-name
semantics.
Example 3.2. Consider a language with constant symbols a, b and unary pred-
icate symbol p, and an interpretation 〈w,Γ〉 with w = 〈{k}, ·I〉 and Γ = {p(a)}.
Then, w |=EΓ ∃x.Lp(x), while w 6|=
A
Γ ∃x.Lp(x), since b
w = aw = k but p(b) /∈ Γ.
A stable expansion is a set of beliefs of an ideally introspective agent (i.e., an
agent with perfect reasoning capabilities and with knowledge about its own beliefs),
given some theory Φ ⊆ LL. Formally, a belief set T ⊆ LL is a stable
E expansion of
a theory Φ ⊆ LL iff T = {φ | Φ |=ET φ}. Similarly, T is a stable
A expansion of Φ iff
T = {φ | Φ |=AT φ}.
Recall that Lg and Lga denote the restrictions of L to ground and ground atomic
formulas, respectively. Given a set of sentences Γ ⊆ LL, Γo, Γog, and Γoga denote
the restrictions of Γ to objective, objective ground, and objective ground atomic
formulas, respectively, i.e., Γo = Γ ∩ L, Γog = Γ ∩ Lg, and Γoga = Γ ∩ Lga.
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Every stable expansion T of Φ is a stable set [Stalnaker 1993], which means that
it satisfies the following conditions: (a) T is closed under first-order entailment,
(b) if φ ∈ T then Lφ ∈ T , and (c) if φ /∈ T then ¬Lφ ∈ T . Furthermore, if T is
consistent, the converse statements of (b) and (c) hold.
Konolige [1991] shows that a stable expansion T of a theory Φ ⊆ LL is determined
by its objective subset To, also called the kernel of T . He further obtained the
following result:
Proposition 3.3 [Konolige 1991]. Let Φ ⊆ LL be a theory without nested
modal operators, Γ ⊆ L a set of objective formulas, and X ∈ {E,A}. Then, Γ =
{φ ∈ L | Φ |=XΓ φ} iff Γ = To, for some stable
X expansion T of Φ.
We slightly adapt this result as follows:
Proposition 3.4. Let Φ ⊆ LL be a theory with only objective atomic formulas
in the scope of occurrences of L, Γ ⊆ L a set of objective formulas, and X ∈ {E,A}.
Then, Γ = {φ ∈ L | Φ |=XΓoga φ} iff Γ = To, for some stable
X expansion T of Φ.
Proof. Since modal atoms in Φ contain only objective atomic formulas, we
obtain Φ |=XΓo φ iff Φ |=
X
Γoga
φ, because, by the definition of satisfaction of modal
formulas, non-ground and non-atomic formulas in Γo do not affect satisfaction of
formulas in Φ. Thus,{φ ∈ L | Φ |=XΓoga φ} = {φ ∈ L | Φ |=
X
Γo
φ} follows.
Since there is no nesting of modal operators in Φ, we combine this result with
Proposition 3.3 to obtain Γo = {φ ∈ L | Φ |=
X
Γo
φ} = {φ ∈ L | Φ |=XΓoga φ} iff
Γo = T ∩ L is the kernel of a stable
X expansion T of Φ.
We note here that, unlike in standard autoepistemic logic, in FO-AEL two dif-
ferent stable expansions may have the same objective subsets, both under the any-
and all-name semantics. Consider, for example, the theories Φ = {∀x.p(x)} and
Φ′ = {∀x.Lp(x)} and their respective stable expansions T and T ′. We have that
To = T
′
o is the closure under first-order entailment of {∀x.p(x)}, but we also have
that ∀x.Lp(x) ∈ T ′ but ∀x.Lp(x) /∈ T , because ∀x.Lp(x) is not satisfied in any
interpretation that has unnamed individuals.
4. EMBEDDING NON-GROUND LOGIC PROGRAMS
We define an embedding τ as a function that takes a logic program P as its argument
and returns a set of sentences in the FO-AEL language obtained from ΣP .
Janhunen [1999] studied translations between nonmonotonic formalisms and for-
mulated a number of desiderata for such translation functions, namely faithfulness,
polynomiality, and modularity (FPM). We adapt these notions to our case of em-
bedding logic programs into FO-AEL.
An embedding τ is faithful if, for any logic program P , there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the stable models of P and the consistent stable expansions
of τ(P ) with respect to ground atomic formulas.
An embedding τ is polynomial if, for any logic program P , τ(P ) can be computed
in time polynomial in the size of P .
An embedding τ ismodular if, for any two logic programs P1 and P2, τ(P1∪P2) =
τ(P1) ∪ τ(P2). Furthermore, we call τ signature-modular if, for any two logic
programs P1 and P2 with the same signature Σ, τ(P1 ∪ P2) = τ(P1) ∪ τ(P2).
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Since the unique names assumption does not hold in FO-AEL in general, it is
necessary to axiomatize default uniqueness of names (as introduced by Konolige
[1991]) to assure faithfulness of several of the embeddings. Given a signature Σ, by
UNAΣ we denote the set of axioms
UNA. ¬L(t1 = t2) ⊃ t1 6= t2, for all distinct t1, t2 ∈ NΣ.
Default uniqueness, in contrast to rigid uniqueness (i.e., UNA axioms of the form
t1 6= t2), allows first-order theories that are later combined with the embedding to
“override” such inequalities, rather than introducing inconsistency. For example,
the theory Φ = {¬L(a = b) ⊃ a 6= b} has a single expansion that includes a 6= b;
the single expansion of Φ ∪ {a = b} is consistent and includes a = b.
Observe that the UNA axioms depend on the signature. In addition, the union
of the UNA axioms of two signatures is not necessarily the same as the set of
UNA axioms of the union of these two signatures: given two signatures Σ1 and
Σ2 such that F1 6= F2, UNAΣ1 ∪ UNAΣ2 6= UNAΣ1∪Σ2 , i.e., the UNA axioms
corresponding to different signatures cannot be combined in a modular fashion.
This means that embeddings that include such UNA signatures are not modular,
but may be signature-modular.
We first present the embeddings of normal programs and then proceed with the
embeddings of disjunctive programs.
4.1 Embedding Normal Logic Programs
We consider three embeddings of non-ground logic programs into FO-AEL, denoted
τHP , τEB , and τEH . “HP” stands for “H orn for Positive rules” (positive rules are
translated to objective Horn clauses); “EB” stands for “Epistemic rule Bodies”
(the body of a rule can only become true if it is known to be true); and “EH ”
stands for “Epistemic rule H eads” (if the body of a rule is true, the head is known
to be true).
The HP embedding is an extension of the one which originally led Gelfond and
Lifschitz to the definition of the stable model semantics [Gelfond 1987; Gelfond
and Lifschitz 1988]. The EB and EH embeddings are extensions of embeddings
by Marek and Truszczynski [1993]. The EH embedding was independently de-
scribed by Lifschitz and Schwarz [1993] and by Chen [1993]. The original moti-
vation for the EB and EH embeddings was the possibility to directly embed pro-
grams with strong negation and disjunction. Furthermore, Marek and Truszczynski
arrived at their embeddings through embeddings of logic programs in reflexive au-
toepistemic logic [Schwarz 1992], which is equivalent to McDermott’s nonmonotonic
modal sw5 [McDermott 1982], and the subsequent embedding of reflexive autoepis-
temic logic into standard AEL. Lifschitz and Schwarz arrived at the EH embedding
through an embedding of logic programs in Lifschitz’s nonmonotonic logic of min-
imal belief and negation-as-failure (MBNF) [Lifschitz 1994] and the subsequent
embedding of MBNF into standard AEL. Finally, Chen also arrived at the EH em-
bedding via MBNF, but he subsequently embedded MBNF in Levesque’s logic of
only knowing [Levesque 1990], a subset of which corresponds with standard AEL.
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Definition 4.1. Let r be a normal rule of the form (1). Then,
τHP (r) = (∀)
∧
ibi ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃ h1,
τEB (r) = (∀)
∧
i(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃ h1,
τEH (r) = (∀)
∧
i(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃ h1 ∧ Lh1.
Furthermore, given a normal logic program P , we define:
τχ(P ) = {τχ(r) | r ∈ P} ∪ UNAΣP , χ ∈ {HP ,EB ,EH }.
For all three embeddings, we assume Στχ(P ) = ΣP (here and henceforth “χ”
ranges over HP , EB , and EH ). Furthermore, by τ−χ we denote the embedding
τχ without the UNA axioms: given a normal logic program P , τ
−
χ (P ) = τχ(P ) −
UNAΣP . The embeddings τ
−
χ are modular and polynomial. The embeddings τχ are
signature-modular and polynomial, provided NΣP is polynomial in the size of P
(e.g., if there are no function symbols with arity greater than 0). In the examples
of embeddings in the remainder of the paper we do not write the UNA axioms
explicitly.
A notable difference between the embedding τHP , on the one hand, and the
embeddings τEB and τEH , on the other, is that, given a logic program P , the
stable expansions of τHP (P ) include the “contrapositives” of the rules in P (viewed
classically and where ¬La is not a), which is not true for τEB (P ) and τEH (P ) in
general.
Example 4.2. Consider P = {p ← q, not r}. The stable expansion of τHP (P ) =
{q∧¬Lr ⊃ p} includes ¬p ⊃ ¬q∨Lr; the expansion of τEB (P ) = {q∧Lq∧¬Lr ⊃ p}
includes ¬p ⊃ ¬Lq ∨ ¬q ∨ Lr, but not ¬p ⊃ ¬q ∨ Lr.
For standard AEL and ground logic programs, the following faithfulness result
straightforwardly extends results by Gelfond and Lifschitz [1988] and Marek and
Truszczynski [1993].
Proposition 4.3. A Herbrand interpretation M of a ground normal logic pro-
gram P is a stable model of P iff there exists a consistent stable expansion T of
τ−χ (P ) in standard AEL such that M = T ∩ Lga.
Observe from the proposition that we do not require the UNA axioms in the
embeddings of ground programs. These axioms are required in the general case
when embedding non-ground programs, as illustrated by Example 4.8 below. The
following example illustrates the embeddings for the case of non-ground programs.
Example 4.4. Consider P = {q(a); p(x); r(x) ← not s(x), p(x)}, which has the
single stable modelM = {q(a), p(a), r(a)}. Likewise, each of the embeddings τχ(P )
has a single consistent stable expansion T χ:
THP = {q(a), p(a), Lp(a), . . . , ∀x(p(x)),¬L∀x(Lp(x)), ∀x(¬Ls(x) ⊃ r(x)), . . . },
TEB = {q(a), p(a), Lp(a), . . . , ∀x(p(x)),¬L∀x(Lp(x)),¬L(∀x(¬Ls(x) ⊃ r(x))), . . . },
TEH = {q(a), p(a), Lp(a), . . . , ∀x(p(x)), ∀x(Lp(x)), ∀x(¬Ls(x) ⊃ r(x)), . . . }.
The stable expansions in Example 4.4 agree on objective ground atoms, but not
on arbitrary formulas. We now extend Proposition 4.3 to the non-ground case. To
this end, we use the following two lemmas.
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Lemma 4.5. Let P be a normal logic program, let X ∈ {E,A}, let T be a stableX
expansion of τχ(P ), and let α be an objective ground atom. Then, τχ(P ) |=XToga α iff
τχ(P ) |=Toga α under the standard names assumption. Moreover, τ
−
HP (P ) |=
A
Toga
α
iff τ−HP (P ) |=Toga α under the standard names assumption.
Proof. We start with the first statement.
(⇒) This is obvious, as interpretations under the standard names assumption are
just special interpretations.
(⇐) We start with the case of the any-names assumption. Assume, on the contrary,
that τχ(P ) |=Toga α under the standard names assumption, but τχ(P ) 6|=
E
Toga
α. This
means that there is some interpretation w = 〈U, ·I〉 such that w |=EToga τχ(P ), but
w 6|=EToga α.
By the fact that the only occurrences of the equality symbol in τχ(P ) are in
the UNA axioms, the only atoms in Toga involving equality are of the form t = t,
for t ∈ NΣP . Consider two distinct names t1, t2 ∈ NΣP and the UNA axiom
¬Lt1 = t2 ⊃ t1 6= t2 ∈ UNAΣP . Since 〈w, Toga〉 is a model of the axiom and
t1 = t2 /∈ Toga , w |=EToga t1 6= t2. Consequently, it must be the case that ·
I maps
every name to a distinct individual in U .
We assume that the mapping ·I extends to ground terms in the natural way, i.e.,
f(t1, . . . , tm)
I = f I(tI1, . . . , t
I
m). We construct the interpretation w
′ = 〈U ′, ·I
′
〉 as
follows: U ′ = N , tI
′
= t, for t ∈ N , and 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∈ p
I′ if 〈tI1, . . . , t
I
n〉 ∈ p
I for
n-ary predicate symbol p and every 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∈ Nn. Clearly, the standard names
assumption holds for w′, and w and w′ agree on objective ground atoms, i.e., w |= α
iff w′ |= α for any α ∈ Lga. We now show that w′ |=Toga τχ(P ).
Clearly, 〈w′, Toga〉 satisfies the UNA axioms since the standard names assumption
holds for w′ and since Toga contains only the trivial equalities. We first consider
the embedding τEH and some
(∀)
∧
1≤i≤m(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤n(¬Lcj) ⊃ h1 ∧ Lh1 ∈ τEH (P ).
Since w |=Toga τEH (P ),
(w,B) |=Toga
∧
1≤i≤m(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
1≤j≤n(¬Lcj) ⊃ h1 ∧ Lh1
for every variable assignment B of w.
Now, consider a variable assignment B′ of w′ and the corresponding variable
assignment B of w, which we define as follows: xB = k iff there is a t ∈ NΣP
such that xB
′
= t and tI = k. Observe that B assigns every variable to a named
individual. Consider a name substitution β which is associated with B; since all
names are interpreted as distinct individuals (by the UNA axioms), (†) β is unique.
Moreover, by construction of B, β is also the only substitution associated with B′ .
By construction of w′, and since β is the unique substitution associated with B
(and B′), we have, for every objective atom α such that B is defined for all variables
in α, that (w,B) |=EToga α iff (w
′, B′) |=EToga α and (w,B) |=
E
Toga
Lα iff (w′, B′) |=EToga
Lα. Consequently, if (w,B) |=EToga h1 ∧ Lh1, then (w
′, B′) |=Toga h1 ∧ Lh1, and if
(w,B) 6|=EToga
∧
bi ∧ Lbi, then (w′, B′) 6|=Toga
∧
bi ∧ Lbi. Furthermore, (w,B) 6|=EToga∧
¬Lcj implies ciβ ∈ Toga for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, (w′, B′) 6|=Toga ¬Lc1 ∧
· · · ∧ ¬Lcn. So,
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(w′, B′) |=Toga b1 ∧ Lb1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm ∧ Lbm ∧ ¬Lc1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Lcn ⊃ h1 ∧ Lh1.
Thus, we obtain w′ |=Toga τEH (P ). Since w and w
′ agree on objective ground atoms,
w′ 6|=Toga α, and thus τEH (P ) 6|=Toga α under the standard names assumption. This
contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, τEH (P ) |=EToga α.
The argument for the embeddings τEB and τHP is analogous: simply leave out the
positive occurrences of modal atoms in the consequents, respectively consequents
and antecedents, in the argument above.
Likewise, the argument for the case of the all-name semantics is analogous. Ob-
serve that in the argument about variable assignments (†), β is the only name
substitution associated with B; hence, the any- and all-name semantics coincide,
and the subsequent arguments immediately apply also for the all-name semantics.
For the second statement, consider the above argument without the part about the
UNA axioms and the following simple adaptation: if (w,B) 6|=AToga
∧
¬Lcj , then for
all associated name substitutions β, there is some ciβ ∈ Toga , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. One
of these name substitutions is the one associated with B′; the remainder of the
argument remains the same. It follows that τ−HP (P ) |=
A
Toga
α iff τ−HP (P ) |=Toga α.
The latter fails for the embeddings τ−EB and τ
−
EH , as there may be several name
substitutions associated with the assignment B in the “⇐” direction above, while
there is a single substitution associated with B′ (see also Example 4.8).
Lemma 4.6. Let P be a normal logic program and X ∈ {E,A}. There exists a
stableX expansion T of τχ(P ) iff there exists a stable
X expansion T ′ of τχ(gr(P ))
such that T ′oga = Toga . The same result holds for τ
−
HP and stable
A expansions.
Proof. We prove the first statement, first for the special case that the standard
names assumption applies, and then use Lemma 4.5 to extend it to cases where the
standard names assumption does not apply.
Consider a belief set Γ ⊆ LL and an interpretation w for which the standard
names assumption holds. We claim that (∗) w |=XΓ τχ(gr(P )) iff w |=
X
Γ τχ(P ). By
the standard names assumption, we have that w |=XΓ τχ(P ) iff for every φ ∈ τχ(P ),
w |=XΓ φ. In turn, this holds iff for every variable assignment B, (w,B) |=
X
Γ φ, which
in turn holds iff for the name substitution β associated with B (which is unique
and total, by the standard names assumption), w |=XΓ φβ. By definition, τχ(gr(P ))
contains all (and only) the formulas of the form φβ where φ ∈ τχ(P ) and β is a
name substitution associated with some variable assignment B for w; the claim (∗)
follows immediately from this.
(⇒) Let T be a stable expansion of τχ(P ). By Lemma 4.5 and the above we have:
{φ ∈ Lga | τχ(P ) |=
X
Toga
φ} = {φ ∈ Lga | τχ(gr(P )) |=
X
Toga
φ}.
Hence by Proposition 3.4,
T ′o = {φ ∈ L | τχ(gr(P )) |=
X
Toga
φ}
is the kernel of a stable expansion T ′ of τχ(gr(P )) and T
′ ∩ Lga = Tga.
The converse is analogous. For the second statement of the lemma, the same proof
using Lemma 4.5 works.
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Theorem 4.7. Let P be a normal logic program and X ∈ {E,A}. A Herbrand
interpretation M is a stable model of P iff there exists a consistent stableX expan-
sion T of τχ(P ) such that M = Toga . The same result holds for τ
−
HP and stable
A
expansions.
Proof. By Lemma 4.6, we can reduce embeddability of non-ground logic pro-
grams to embeddability of ground logic programs.
Consider an embedding τχ(gr(P )) and a stable expansion T . Clearly, there is
no interaction between the UNA axioms and the axioms resulting from rules in P .
Therefore, τ−χ (gr(P )) has a stable expansion T
′ such that T ′oga = Toga , and vice
versa. The theorem then follows immediately from Proposition 4.3.
Note that this result does not extend to the embeddings τ−χ under the any-name
semantics, nor does it extend to the embeddings τ−EB and τ
−
EH under the all-name
semantics, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 4.8. Consider P = {p(n1); r(n2); q ← not p(x)} such that ΣP has
only two names, n1 and n2. P has one stable model, M = {p(n1), r(n2), q}.
τ−HP (P ) = {p(n1); r(n2); ∀x(¬Lp(x) ⊃ q)} has one stable
E expansion, T = {p(n1),
r(n2), Lp(n1), Lr(n2), ¬Lp(n2), . . . }. T does not include q. To see why this is the
case, consider an interpretation w with only one individual k. Lp(x) is trivially true
under the any-name semantics, because there is some name for k such that p(t) ∈ T
(viz. t = n1). In the all-name semantics, this situation does not occur, because for
Lp(x) to be true, p(t) must be included in T for every name (t = n1 and t = n2)
for k. One can similarly verify that the result does not apply to the embeddings
τ−EB and τ
−
EH under the all-name semantics, by the positive modal atoms in the
antecedents.
4.2 Embedding Disjunctive Logic Programs
The embeddings τHP and τEB cannot be straightforwardly extended to the case of
disjunctive logic programs, even for the propositional case. Consider the program
P = {a | b←}, which has two stable models: M1 = {a} and M2 = {b}. However, a
naive extension of τHP , τHP (P ) = {a∨b}, has one stable expansion T = {a∨b, L(a∨
b),¬La,¬Lb, . . . }. In contrast, τEH can be straightforwardly extended because of
the modal atoms in the consequent of the implication: τ∨EH(P ) = {(a ∧ La) ∨
(b ∧ Lb)} has two stable expansions T1 = {a ∨ b, a, La,¬Lb, . . . } and T2 = {a ∨
b, b, Lb,¬La, . . .}.
The so-called positive introspection axioms (PIAs) [Przymusinski 1991a] remedy
this situation for defining extensions τ∨HP and τ
∨
EB of τHP and τEB , respectively.
Let PIAΣ be the set of axioms
PIA. α ⊃ Lα, for every objective ground atom α of LΣ.
Each PIA ensures that a consistent stable expansion contains either α or ¬α.
It would have been possible to define the PIAs in a different way: (∀) φ ⊃ Lφ for
any objective atomic formula φ. This would, however, effectively close the domain
of the predicates in ΣP (see Example 3.1). We deem this aspect undesirable in
combinations with FO theories.
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Definition 4.9. Let r be a rule of form (1). Then:
τ∨HP (r) = (∀)
∧
ibi ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃
∨
khk,
τ∨EB(r) = (∀)
∧
i(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃
∨
khk,
τ∨EH(r) = (∀)
∧
i(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
j¬Lcj ⊃
∨
k(hk ∧ Lhk).
Given a disjunctive logic program P , we define:
τ∨HP (P ) = {τ
∨
HP (r) | r ∈ P} ∪ PIAΣP ∪ UNAΣP ,
τ∨EB(P ) = {τ
∨
EB(r) | r ∈ P} ∪ PIAΣP ∪ UNAΣP ,
τ∨EH(P ) = {τ
∨
EH(r) | r ∈ P} ∪UNAΣP .
As before, by τ∨−χ we denote the embedding τ
∨
χ without the UNA axioms. Note that
the observations about modularity of the embeddings τχ extend to the disjunctive
embeddings τ∨χ ; the PIAs do not compromise modularity. However, polynomiality
of embeddings with PIAs is lost if the size of Lga is not polynomial in the size of
P . We do not write the UNA and PIA axioms explicitly in the examples below.
For standard AEL and ground disjunctive logic programs, the correspondence
between the stable models of P and the stable expansions τ∨HP (P ) and τ
∨
EH(P ),
respectively, is due to Przymusinski [1991a] and Marek and Truszczynski [1993].
Proposition 4.10. A Herbrand interpretation M of a ground disjunctive logic
program P is a stable model of P iff there is a consistent stable expansion T of
τ∨−HP (P ) (resp., τ
∨−
EH (P )) in standard AEL such that M = Toga .
We generalize this result to the case of FO-AEL and non-ground programs, and
additionally for τ∨EB, similar to the case of normal programs.
Lemma 4.11. Let P be a logic program, let X ∈ {E,A}, let T be a stableX
expansion of τ∨χ (P ), and let α be an objective ground atom. Then, τ
∨
χ (P ) |=
X
Toga
α iff
τ∨χ (P ) |=Toga α under the standard names assumption. Moreover, τ
∨−
EH (P ) |=
A
Toga
α
iff τ∨−EH (P ) |=Toga α.
Proof. (⇒) Trivial (cf. the “⇒” direction in Lemma 4.5).
(⇐) The argument is a straightforward adaptation of the argument in the “⇐”
direction in the proof of Lemma 4.5: simply replace the consequent h1 ∧ Lh1 with
the disjunction (h1 ∧Lh1)∨ · · ·∨ (hl ∧Lhl). Furthermore, it is also easy to see that,
as w and w′ agree on ground atomic formulas, if the PIA axioms are satisfied in
〈w, Toga〉, then they are satisfied in 〈w′, Toga〉.
Lemma 4.12. Let P be a logic program and let X ∈ {E,A}. There exists a
stableX expansion T of τ∨χ (P ) iff there exists a stable
X expansion T ′ of τ∨χ (gr(P ))
with T ′oga = Toga . The same result holds for τ
∨−
EH and stable
A expansions.
Proof. The proof is obtained from the proof of Lemma 4.6 by replacing occur-
rences of τχ with τ
∨
χ and using Lemma 4.11 in place of Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 4.13. Let P be a logic program and let X ∈ {E,A}. A Herbrand
interpretationM is a stable model of P iff there exists a consistent stableX expansion
T of τ∨χ (P ) such that M = Toga . The same result holds for τ
∨−
EH and stable
A
expansions.
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Proof. The reduction of embeddability of non-ground programs in FO-AEL to
ground logic programs in standard AEL follows from Lemma 4.12.
Embeddability of gr(P ) using τ∨HP and τ
∨
EH follows from Proposition 4.10. Em-
beddability of gr(P ) using τ∨EB then follows from the embeddability of τ
∨
HP , com-
bined with the PIA axioms (α ⊃ Lα): consider a formula
∧
(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
(¬Lcj) ⊃∨
hk in τ
∨
EB(gr(P )) and some bi. If some model 〈w,Γ〉 of τ
∨
EB(gr(P )) satisfies bi,
then Lbi must also be satisfied in 〈w,Γ〉 (by the PIA axioms). Therefore, the stable
expansions of τ∨HP (P ) and τ
∨
EB(P ) must be the same.
A notable difference between the embeddings τ∨HP and τ
∨
EB, on the one hand, and
τ∨EH , on the other, is the presence, respectively absence, of the PIA axioms, as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 4.14. Consider P = {p | q ← }. Then, τ∨HP (P ) = {p ∨ q} ∪ PIAΣP has
the stable expansions THP1 = {p,¬q, Lp,¬Lq, . . . } and T
HP
2 = {q,¬p, Lq,¬Lp, . . . },
while τ∨EH(P ) = { (p∧Lp)∨ (q∧Lq) } has the stable expansions T
EH
1 = {p, Lp,¬Lq,
. . . } and TEH2 = {q, Lp,¬Lp, . . . }; the latter include neither ¬q nor ¬p.
Note that the embedding τHP cannot be naively extended to logic programs with
strong (“classical”) negation ∼ [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991], even for the proposi-
tional case. Take, for example, the logic program P = {p←∼ p}; it has one stable
model, namely M = ∅. The naive extension of τHP treats strong negation as nega-
tion in classical logic and the embedding of P yields {¬p ⊃ p}, which has one stable
expansion, which includes p. It was shown by Marek and Truszczynski [1993] that,
for the propositional case, the embeddings τEB and τEH can be naively extended
to the case of logic programs with strong negation: consider a rule of the form
(1) such that hi, bj , ck are either atoms or strongly negated atoms, and an exten-
sion of the embeddings τEB , τEH such that ∼ is translated to classical negation ¬;
then, Proposition 4.3 straightforwardly extends to these extended versions of τEB
and τEH [Marek and Truszczynski 1993]. These results can be straightforwardly
extended to the non-ground case. Embedding of logic programs with strong nega-
tion using τHP can be done by rewriting P to a logic program P
′ without strong
negation and subsequently embedding P ′; see [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991] for such
a rewriting.
5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE EMBEDDINGS
In this section, we explore correspondences between the embeddings presented in
the previous section. We compare the stable expansions of the individual embed-
dings and, at the level of inference, we compare the sets of autoepistemic conse-
quences. To this end we introduce the following notation:
Definition 5.1. Let Φ1,Φ2 ⊆ LL be FO-AEL theories and X ∈ {E,A}. We write
Φ1 ≡X Φ2 if Φ1 and Φ2 have the same stable
X expansions. For γ ∈ {o, og , oga} we
write Φ1 ≡
X
γ Φ2 if, for each stable
X expansion T of Φ1, there exists some stable
X
expansion T ′ of Φ2 such that Tγ = T
′
γ , and vice versa.
Note the implication chain Φ1 ≡X Φ2 ⇒ Φ1 ≡Xo Φ2 ⇒ Φ1 ≡
X
og Φ2 ⇒ Φ1 ≡
X
oga Φ2.
Definition 5.2. A formula φ is an autoepistemicX consequence of a theory Φ ⊆
LL, X ∈ {E,A}, if φ belongs to every stable
X expansion of Φ. CnX(Φ) denotes the
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set of all autoepistemicX consequences of Φ.
The properties stated in this section holds regardless of whether X = E or X = A
is considered. Therefore, we omit the superscript X from |=X, ≡Xγ , Cn
X, stableX,
etc. Furthermore, we write Cnγ(Φ) for Cn(Φ)γ (= Cn(Φ) ∩ LLγ).
In our analysis, we consider different classes of logic programs. With the symbols
LP , sLP , and gLP we denote the classes of arbitrary, safe, and ground disjunctive
logic programs, respectively. Observe the following inclusions between the classes:
gLP ⊆ sLP ⊆ LP.
We use the letter n to denote the restriction of the respective classes to the case of
normal programs: nLP , snLP , and gnLP .
We start in Section 5.1 with an investigation of the correspondences between
stable expansions and subsequently consider in Section 5.2 correspondences between
sets of consequences. Note that while Φ1 ≡γ Φ2 implies Cnγ(Φ1) = Cnγ(Φ2), the
converse is not true in general. Thus, for applications based on consequence rather
than stable expansions, more flexibility between the choice of equivalent embeddings
can be expected as one-to-one correspondence between stable expansions is not
required. In order not to interrupt the flow of reading, the proofs of most of the
results in this section can be found in the appendix.
5.1 Relationships between Stable Expansions of Embeddings
From Theorems 4.7 and 4.13 we immediately obtain the following result concerning
correspondence of stable expansions, which is our main result in this regard.
Theorem 5.3. For every P ∈ LP, τ(P ) ≡oga τ ′(P ) for all τ, τ ′ ∈ {τ∨HP , τ
∨
EB ,
τ∨EH}, and if P ∈ nLP, then τ(P ) ≡oga τ
′(P ) for all τ, τ ′ ∈ {τHP , τEB , τEH , τ
∨
HP ,
τ∨EB, τ
∨
EH}.
Thus, all embeddings may be used interchangeably when concerned with ground
atoms. This does not hold for the case of arbitrary objective ground formulas.
Example 5.4. Consider the logic program P = {a← b}. Then τHP (P ) = {b ⊃ a}
has a single stable expansion, which contains b ⊃ a; also τEB (P ) = {b∧Lb ⊃ a} has
a single stable expansion, but it does not contain b ⊃ a. Note that while the latter
contains Lb ⊃ b, it does not contain b ⊃ Lb (which would enable obtaining b ⊃ a).
The situation changes for the embeddings τ∨HP and τ
∨
EB due to the PIA axioms.
Proposition 5.5. For every P ∈ nLP, τEB (P ) ≡og τEH (P ), and for every
P ∈ LP, τ∨HP (P ) ≡og τ
∨
EB(P ).
For non-ground formulas we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.6. For every P ∈ snLP, τEB (P ) ≡ τEH (P ).
For arbitrary normal programs, the embeddings τEB and τEH differ.
Example 5.7. Consider P = {p(a); p(x); q(x) ← p(x)}. Then, the embedding
τEH (P ) = {p(a) ∧ Lp(a), ∀x.p(x) ∧ Lp(x), ∀x.p(x) ∧ Lp(x) ⊃ q(x) ∧ Lq(x)} has one
stable expansion, which contains ∀x.q(x), while τEB (P ) = {p(a), ∀x.p(x), ∀x.p(x)∧
Lp(x) ⊃ q(x)} has one stable expansion, which does not contain ∀x.q(x), because
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∀x.Lp(x) is not necessarily true when ∀x.p(x) is true; in other words, the converse
Barcan formula (L∀x.φ(x) ⊃ ∀x.Lφ(x)) is not universally valid, which is a property
of FO-AEL under both the any- and all-name semantics [Konolige 1991].
Note that the result also does not extend to the embeddings τHP and τ
∨
HP .
Example 5.8. Consider P = {q(x) ← p(x)}. Then, τHP (P ) = {∀x.p(x) ⊃
q(x)} has one stable expansion, which contains ∀x.p(x) ⊃ q(x), while τEB (P ) =
{∀x.p(x)∧Lp(x) ⊃ q(x)} has one stable expansion which does not contain ∀x.p(x) ⊃
q(x). This difference is caused by the fact that Lp(x) will be false in case an un-
named individual is assigned to x. Similar observations hold for τ∨HP ; the PIA
axioms do not help, since they are only concerned with ground atoms and thus do
not apply to unnamed individuals.
Proposition 5.9. If P ∈ gLP, then τ∨HP (P ) ≡ τ
∨
EB(P ).
Note that this result does not extend to the embedding τ∨EH ; it does not include
the PIA axioms, and thus the argument used in the proof of Proposition 5.9 does
not apply.
5.2 Relationships between Consequences of Embeddings
In order to investigate the relationships between the embeddings with respect to
autoepistemic consequences, we first compare the embeddings with respect to their
autoepistemic models. Recall that an autoepistemic interpretation 〈w, T 〉 consists
of a first-order interpretation w and a belief set T ⊆ LL.
Proposition 5.10. For every P ∈ nLP and every interpretation 〈w, T 〉, w |=T
τEH (P ) implies w |=T τEB (P ) and w |=T τHP (P ) implies w |=T τEB (P ).
Proposition 5.11. For every P ∈ LP and every interpretation 〈w, T 〉, w |=T
τ∨HP (P ) implies w |=T τ
∨
EB(P ). Furthermore, if P is safe, then w |=T τ
∨
EB(P )
implies w |=T τ
∨
EH(P ).
We now consider the relative behavior of the embeddings with respect to autoepis-
temic consequences. In order to present our results in a compact and accessible way,
we show a small (yet sufficient) number of relationships between the sets of conse-
quences in a graph (Figure 1). Every particular relationship between embeddings
can be easily derived from paths in this graph.
Specifically, in Figure 1(a), C
(∨)
χ is short for Cno(τ
(∨)
χ (P )), the straight arrow
−→ represents set inclusion (⊆), and the dotted arrow 99K represents set inclusion
in case P is safe. Since −→ implies 99K, dotted arrows are only shown if straight
arrows are absent. Similarly, in Figure 1(b), C
(∨)
χ is short for Cnog(τ
(∨)
χ (P )), and
−→ represents set inclusion.
The main results visible from Figure 1 are that with respect to all objective
consequences, τEB is the weakest embedding (yielding a smallest set of conclusions)
while τ∨HP and τ
∨
EH are strongest; if the embedded program is safe, then τ
∨
EH
is the strongest embedding and τEB the weakest, collapsing with τEH and τ
∨
EH .
With respect to ground objective consequences, τ∨HP collapses with τ
∨
EB and is the
strongest embedding, while τEB is the weakest and again collapses with τEH and
τ∨EH ; safety of the program does not change the picture. Note that with respect to
objective ground atomic consequences, all embeddings collapse (cf. Theorem 5.3).
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C∨EB
// C∨HP
C∨
EH
= CEH
OO
++
CEBnn
eeKKKKKKKKKK
// CHP
bbEEEEEEEEE
C∨EB = C
∨
HP
C∨
EH
= CEH = CEB
OO
// CHP
ggOOOOOOOOOOOO
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Inclusion between sets of (a) all objective and (b) all objective ground consequences.
The following lemma states the correctness of Figure 1(a).
Lemma 5.12. If C
(∨)
χ −→C
(∨)
γ (resp., C
(∨)
χ 99KC
(∨)
γ ) in the graph of Figure 1(a),
then Cno(τ
(∨)
χ (P ))⊆Cno(τ
(∨)
γ (P )) for every P ∈nLP (resp., for every P ∈ snLP).
Furthermore, if C∨χ −→C
∨
γ (resp., C
∨
χ 99KC
∨
γ ), then Cno(τ
∨
χ (P ))⊆Cno(τ
∨
γ (P )) for
every P ∈LP (resp., for every P ∈ sLP).
Note that by transitivity of ⊆, paths in the graph yield further relations; e.g.,
Cno(τEB (P )) ⊆ Cno(τ∨HP (P )) since CEB reaches C
∨
HP via a path with straight
edges.
We now show that the graph exactly characterizes the containment relationships
via paths. To this end, we first note some negative relationships between embed-
dings.
Lemma 5.13. The following inclusion relations do not hold: Cno(τ
∨
EH(P )) ⊆
Cno(τ
∨
HP (P )), for every P ∈ LP; Cno(τ
∨
EB(P )) ⊆ Cno(τHP (P )), for every P ∈
snLP; and Cno(τHP (P )) ⊆ Cno(τ∨EB(P )), for every P ∈ snLP.
From these negative relationships, combined with the positive ones above, we can
infer further negative relationships. For example, from C∨EH 6⊆ C
∨
EB and C
∨
EH ⊆
CEH , we infer CEH 6⊆ C∨EB. Exploiting this, we show the following result.
Theorem 5.14. For P ∈nLP (resp., P ∈ snLP), Cno(τ
(∨)
χ (P ))⊆Cno(τ
(∨)
γ (P ))
iff C
(∨)
γ is reachable from C
(∨)
χ in the graph in Figure 1(a) on a path with −→ arcs
(resp., with arbitrary arcs).
Likewise, for P ∈LP (resp., P ∈ sLP), we have that Cno(τ∨χ (P ))⊆Cno(τ
∨
γ (P ))
iff C∨γ is reachable from C
∨
χ on a path with −→ (resp., with arbitrary arcs).
Proof. By Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13, the respective containment relationships are
correct. Clearly, by reflexivity and transitivity of set inclusion, paths in the graph
of Figure 1(a) are sound with respect to positive containments. Their completeness,
for both arbitrary P and safe P , is established using the following basic properties
of non-inclusion: (i) A 6⊆ B and C ⊆ B implies A 6⊆ C and (ii) A 6⊆ B and
A ⊆ C implies C 6⊆ B.5 Exhaustive application to the (non-)containments in
Lemmas 5.12 and 5.13 (e.g., using a simple logic program) yields one of C
(∨)
χ ⊆ C
(∨)
γ
and C
(∨)
χ 6⊆ C
(∨)
γ for each pair C
(∨)
χ , C
(∨)
γ .
5Note that non-inclusion for normal programs implies non-inclusion for disjunctive programs, since
every normal program is a fortiori a disjunctive program.
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Accordingly, CEB ⊆ C∨EH and CEB ⊆ C
∨
HP are the only nontrivial inclusions for
arbitrary programs besides those in Figure 1(a); for safe programs, there are more.
We note that the figure is minimal, in the sense that if any of the arcs is removed
(or turned from solid into dashed), the theorem no longer holds.
The containment relationships in Figure 1(b) are easily obtained from the already
established results.
Theorem 5.15. For every P ∈nLP, Cnog(τ
(∨)
χ (P )) ⊆ Cnog(τ
(∨)
γ (P )) holds iff
C
(∨)
γ is reachable from C
(∨)
χ in the graph in Figure 1(b). Furthermore, for every
P ∈LP, Cnog(τ∨χ (P )) ⊆ Cnog(τ
∨
γ (P )) holds iff C
∨
γ is reachable from C
∨
χ .
Proof. By Theorem 5.14 and Proposition 5.5, C∨EH , CEH , and CEB collapse,
and by Proposition 5.5, C∨EB and C
∨
HP collapse. That the other relationships in
Figure 1(a) remain unchanged follows from Example 5.4, the proof of Lemma 5.13,
and reasoning about subsets as in the proof of Theorem 5.14.
6. COMBINATIONS WITH FIRST-ORDER THEORIES
In this section we explore correspondences between the logic program embeddings
from Section 4 in combinations with FO theories. To this end, we consider a basic
combination of logic programs P and FO theories Φ defined as
ι(∨)χ (Φ, P ) = Φ ∪ τ
(∨)
χ (P ) ⊆ LL
where ΣLL is the union of the signatures ΣΦ and ΣP . More involved combinations
(e.g., which augment P and Φ with further rules and axioms, respectively) might
be recast to such basic combinations.
In the preceding sections we have considered both the any- and all-name seman-
tics, both in the definition of the embeddings and in our analysis of the differences
between the embeddings of logic programs. It turned out that the embeddings are
faithful for both semantics (cf. Theorems 4.7 and 4.13), implying correspondence
with respect to objective ground atoms between the two semantics for all embed-
dings τ
(∨)
χ , and the relationships between the embeddings stated in the previous
section hold for both semantics. However, in combinations with FO theories, the
two semantics diverge since names from the first-order part may not be provably
identical to or different from other names. The following example illustrates differ-
ences between the semantics in the face of positive and negative occurrences of the
modal operator.
Example 6.1. Consider the logic program P :
q(a),
r ← p(x), not q(x),
s(x)← p(x),
and the FO theory Φ = {p(b)}. We note here that the signature of P contains only
one function symbol, the constant constant a. Consequently, UNAΣP = ∅.
ιEB (Φ, P ) has one stable
E expansion TE and one stableA expansion TA. TE
contains q(a), but not q(b); both contain p(b), but not p(a). Consider an inter-
pretation w = 〈U, ·I〉 such that aw = bw = k, k ∈ pI , k ∈ qI , k ∈ sI , and w 6|= r,
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and a variable assignment B such that xB = k. Then, β = {x/a} is an associated
name substitution and q(x)β ∈ TE, and so (w,B) |=E
TE
Lq(x). Another associated
name substitution is β = {x/b}, and so (w,B) |=E
TE
Lp(x). So, w |=E
TE
ιEB (Φ, P )
and thus r /∈ TE. One can straightforwardly argue that ιEB (Φ, P ) |=ET s(b), and
therefore s(b) ∈ TE.
Consider an interpretation w′ that is like w, except that k 6∈ sI and w′ |= r.
Since TA does not contain p(a), (w′, B) 6|=A
TA
Lp(x). TA does not contain q(b), but
(w,B) |=A
TA
Lq(x) holds only if q(x)β ∈ TA for every β associated with B, including
β = {x/b}, and so (w′, B) |=A
TA
¬Lq(x) and w′ |=A
TA
ιEB (Φ, P ). Consequently,
s(b) 6∈ TA. It is straightforward to verify that r ∈ TA.
In order to avoid a proliferation of results, following Konolige [1991], we concentrate
in this section on the any-name semantics. In the following section we discuss our
results in the light of the standard names assumption, for which the any- and
all-name semantics coincide.
In our analysis we consider the same syntactic classes of programs as in the
previous section and we consider the following classes of objective theories:
arbitrary (FoL = 2L), universal (Uni), Horn (Horn), generalized Horn
(gHorn), propositional (Prop), and empty ({∅}, i.e., in semantic terms,
tautological) FO theories.
Generalized Horn formulas have the form (∀)b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bn ⊃ ∃~y.h where all bi and
h are atomic and variables ~y occur only in h, which may be absent. Note that
similar formulas (∀)b1 ∧· · ·∧ bn ⊃ ∃~y.(h1∧· · ·∧hm) where all bi and hj are atomic,
can be easily cast to gHorn formulas by replacing the conjunction h1 ∧ · · · ∧ hm
with p(~x), where ~x are its free variables and p is a new predicate symbol, and
including formulas ∀~x.p(~x) ⊃ hj for each hj ; the resulting theory is equivalent
with respect to the original signature. The class gHorn captures RDF Schema
[de Bruijn and Heymans 2007], DLs such as Horn-SHIQ [Hustadt et al. 2005] and
the OWL 2 profiles EL, QL, and RL, as well as Tuple Generating Dependencies
(TGDs), which play an important role in relational databases; Cal`ı et al. [2009]
survey decidable fragments of TGDs that amount to decidable fragments of gHorn
(see also Sections 7 and 9.1).
The order diagram is as follows (arrows stand for set inclusion):
Prop // Uni
**VVV
VVV
V
{∅}
44iiiiii
**UUU
UUU FoL
Horn //
88qqqqqqqq
gHorn
44hhhhh
For all pairs of classes of logic programs and FO theories, we determine the relation-
ships between stable expansions of different combinations ι
(∨)
χ (Φ, P ) and ι
(∨)
γ (Φ, P )
at different levels of granularity. As in Section 5.1, we concentrate here on cor-
respondences of stable expansions ≡Ex ; they imply that relative to the class x of
formulas, the embeddings τ
(∨)
χ (P ) and τ
(∨)
γ (P ) are interchangeable in combina-
tions.
In Section 6.1, we state our main result on the relationships between stable
expansions of combinations and make several observations. In Section 6.2, we
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Table I. Correspondences between stable expansions of combinations
(on programs in the joint definition range); ι
(∨)
x is short for ι
(∨)
x (Φ, P ).
Φ \ P LP sLP gLP
FoL ιEH ≡
E ι∨EH ιEB ≡
E ιEH
ι∨
HP
≡E ι∨
EB
Uni
gHorn ιHP ≡
E
oga ιEH
ι∨HP ≡
E
oga ι
∨
EH
Horn
Prop ι∨
HP
≡Eog ι
∨
EB
ιEB ≡
E ιEH
ιEB ≡
E
og ιEH
{∅}
ιHP ≡
E
oga ιEB
ιHP ≡
E
oga ιEH
ι∨HP ≡
E
oga ι
∨
EH
establish the partial results necessary for deriving our main result. The proofs of
the partial results can be found in the appendix.
6.1 Relationships between Stable Expansions of Combinations
Our results are summarized in Table I, which gives a complete picture of the corre-
spondences, where each entry represents a most general correspondence, i.e., neither
the correspondence ≡Ex nor the logic program or FO theory class may be relaxed.
This is formally stated in the main theorem of this section (Theorem 6.2). In brief,
our central results are that several of the embeddings become interchangeable when
considering positive normal programs combined with gHorn or Horn theories (cf.
Proposition 6.3) as well as the correspondences for combinations with ground logic
programs, even allowed to contain negation (cf. the rightmost column of Table I).
We call Φ1 ≡Ex Φ2 a trivial inference from a set Q of equivalences if it is derivable
fromQ by the fact that Φ1 ≡E Φ2 implies Φ1 ≡Eog Φ2 and Φ1 ≡
E
og Φ2 implies Φ1 ≡
E
oga
Φ2, as well as by reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry of ≡Ey , y∈ {ǫ, og, oga}.
Theorem 6.2. Let X be a class of FO theories, let Y be a class of programs, and
let x∈{ǫ, og , oga}. Then ιχ(Φ, P ) ≡Ex ιγ(Φ, P ) holds for all Φ∈X and all P ∈Y iff
ιχ(Φ, P ) ≡Ex ιγ(Φ, P ) follows for cell (X ,Y) in Table I by trivial inferences, where
χ, γ ∈ {∨HP ,
∨
EB,
∨
EH} if P ∈ LP and χ, γ ∈ {HP ,EB,EH ,
∨
HP ,
∨
EB,
∨
EH} if P ∈nLP.
We will establish the results of Table I and provide some intuitive explanations
about partial results in the next subsection.
Note that removing any statement from Table I or modifying any correspondence
type invalidates the theorem. We do not explicitly consider correspondence of stable
expansions with respect to objective formulas, i.e., ≡Eo . Clearly, Φ1 ≡
E Φ2 implies
Φ1 ≡Eo Φ2; in addition, all the counterexamples to Φ1 ≡
E Φ2 presented in the
following subsection also apply to Φ1 ≡Eo Φ2. Hence, ≡
E
o coincides with ≡
E.
The use of negation is essential for establishing non-correspondence in some cases,
as we have the following result for positive programs and Horn theories.
Proposition 6.3. For every (Φ, P ) ∈ gHorn×snLP such that P is positive,
ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEH (Φ, P ), and for every (Φ, P ) ∈ Horn×nLP such that P is
positive, ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ιEH (Φ, P ).
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This result does not extend to the disjunctive embeddings, because there are no
PIA axioms for the atoms involving names not in P , and it does not extend to more
general formulas (cf., e.g., Example 4.2).
We make the following further observations.
—The various combinations behave differently in the general case. Only two of
them, EH and
∨
EH , are always equivalent (they coincide on normal programs).
—For combinations with arbitrary FO theories, further correspondences are only
present for ground logic programs in some cases. Narrowing to any of the classes
that allow predicates of arity > 0 (Horn, gHorn , Uni) does not change the
picture.
—For arbitrary logic programs, only in case of propositional theories do some combi-
nations behave equivalently. Requiring safety leads only for propositional theories
and in one case (EB and EH) to a stronger correspondence.
—Uni and Horn show no most general correspondences, which means that with
respect to more general or more restrictive classes, their change in syntax does
not affect equivalence.
—In contrast, the important class gHorn has maximal correspondences for ground
programs. Thus, for combinations with FO theories from the classes Horn ,
gHorn , and Uni , we have equivalent behavior only for ground programs in some
cases (apart from EH and
∨
EH).
—The effect of program grounding (which is a customary technique applied by non-
monotonic rule engines) in combinations is thus beneficial for the embeddings τEB
and τEH , making them interchangeable; this is similar for τ
∨
HP and τ
∨
EB and for
τHP , τEB , τEH , resp. τ
∨
HP , τ
∨
EB, τ
∨
EH , in combinations with a gHorn first-order
part with respect to ground atomic formulas. In fact, the interchangeability of
τEB and τEH lifts by Proposition 6.3 to the non-ground level for gHorn FO parts
and safe positive programs (which are at the core of rule bases in practice), with
respect to ground atomic formulas. Importantly, the proof of Proposition 6.3
shows that the combination is invariant under program grounding, so this tech-
nique can be readily applied. We get a similar picture for τHP , τEB , τEH in
combinations of Horn FO parts with positive programs. (For applications, see
Section 7.)
We illustrate the use of the result in Theorem 6.2 with an example. Note that if
the stable expansions of two embeddings or combinations correspond with respect
to a certain class formulas, then the embeddings, resp. combinations, also agree on
autoepistemic consequences for these classes.
Example 6.4. Consider P = {q(a); p(x); r(x) ← not s(x), p(x)} from Exam-
ple 4.4, which is neither safe nor ground. Hence, to determine correspondence
between embeddings, we use the first column of Table I. As P is normal, all
equations in the column are applicable. We have that, e.g., τEB (P ) ≡Eog τEH (P ),
τ∨HP (P ) ≡
E
og τ
∨
EB(P ), and τHP (P ) ≡
E
oga τEB (P ). Let Φ be a propositional theory;
then we also have ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡Eog ιEH (Φ, P ) and ι
∨
HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E
og ι
∨
EB(Φ, P ), but not
ιHP (P ) ≡Eoga ιEB (P ). Furthermore, we can conclude that ιEB (P ) and ιEH (P ), and
also ι∨HP (P ) and ι
∨
EB(P ), agree on objective ground autoepistemic consequences.
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6.2 Derivation of the Results
We start with the positive results. Trivially, ιEH and ι
∨
EH coincide for arbitrary
FO theories, and the the equivalence results for empty Φ in Table I carry over from
the respective results on embeddings in Section 5.
We show that for ground programs, the τEB and τEH embeddings are inter-
changeable in any combination with an FO theory.
Proposition 6.5. For every (Φ, P ) ∈ FoL×gnLP, ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡E ιEH (Φ, P ).
Intuitively, this holds because only named individuals matter in rules, and hence
the modal atoms Lh in embedded rule heads do not matter. However, this does not
generalize from ground to safe programs, as the evaluation of literals ¬Lp(x) in the
rule bodies does not amount to grounding (see Proposition 6.10(4)).
Also the τ∨HP and τ
∨
EH embeddings are interchangeable in combinations with
arbitrary FO theories if the logic program is ground.
Proposition 6.6. For every (Φ, P ) ∈ FoL×gLP, ι∨HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E ι∨EB(Φ, P ).
The reason is that we can eliminate all modal atoms Lb from rule bodies with the
PIA axioms in ι∨EB(Φ, P ) and obtain ι
∨
HP (Φ, P ). Such elimination is not possible
in the non-ground case, since the PIAs only apply to atoms from ΣP .
Moving now to fragments of FoL, i.e., down the rows in Table I, we first have:
Proposition 6.7. For (Φ, P ) ∈ gHorn×gLP , ι∨HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ι
∨
EH(Φ, P ), and
if P ∈ gnLP, then ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEH (Φ, P ).
Intuitively, in the first case, we can add modal atoms Lb in the bodies and Lh
in the heads of τHP (P ), by the PIA axioms, thereby obtaining ι
∨
EH(Φ, P ). To
go from τEH to τHP is possible if Φ is not disjunctive with respect to atoms h.
This is the case for a Horn Φ, and similarly for a generalized Horn Φ, as we can
apply skolemization. In the second case, there are no PIA axioms, but we can
similarly apply skolemization and obtain a disjunction-free theory that is Horn
modulo modal atoms. Skolemization does not work for non-ground programs in
this case, as previously unnamed individuals are named by skolem terms.
We note that, combined with previous results, we can infer from Proposition 6.7
that Theorem 5.3 generalizes from embeddings to combinations with generalized
Horn theories for the case of ground logic programs.
For propositional theories, we obtain a result symmetric to Proposition 6.6 for
arbitrary logic programs.
Proposition 6.8. For every (Φ, P ) ∈ Prop×LP, ι∨HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E
og ι
∨
EB(Φ, P ).
Intuitively, this holds because a propositional Φ cannot interfere with names of
individuals—it has no names. Therefore, as in the case of the embeddings τ∨HP and
τ∨EB, we can eliminate all modal atoms Lb from rule bodies in ι
∨
EB(Φ, P ) to obtain
ι∨HP (Φ, P ). For similar reasons, also correspondence results for the embeddings τEB
and τEH extend to combinations with propositional theories.
Proposition 6.9. For every (Φ, P ) ∈ Prop×nLP, ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡Eog ιEH (Φ, P ),
and if P ∈ snLP, then ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡E ιEH (Φ, P ).
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It turns out that the results in the preceding propositions cannot be extended to
more general classes of programs or theories, or larger subsets of stable expansions.
Proposition 6.10. There are pairs (Φ, P ) in
(1 ) Prop×gnLP such that ιχ(Φ, P ) 6≡Eoga ιγ(Φ, P ), for (χ, γ) ∈ {(HP ,EB ),
(HP ,
∨
HP ), (
∨
HP ,
∨
EH )};
(2 ) {∅}×gnLP such that ιχ(Φ, P ) 6≡Eog ιγ(Φ, P ), for (χ, γ) ∈ {(HP ,EB ), (HP ,
∨
HP ),
(∨HP ,
∨
EH )};
(3 ) {∅}×snLP such that ι∨HP (Φ, P ) 6≡
E ι∨EB(Φ, P );
(4 ) Horn×snLP such that ιχ(Φ, P ) 6≡Eoga ιγ(Φ, P ), for (χ, γ) ∈ {(HP ,EB),
(HP ,EH), (EB,EH), (HP ,
∨
HP ), (HP ,
∨
EB), (EB ,
∨
EB), (EB,
∨
HP ), (
∨
HP ,
∨
EB),
(EH ,
∨
EB), (EH ,
∨
HP )}; and
(5 ) {∅}×nLP such that ιEB (Φ, P ) 6≡E ιEH (Φ, P ).
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Correctness of the table (i.e., the ‘⇐’ direction of the
theorem) follows from the fact that τEH (P ) and τ
∨
EH(P ) are identical for normal
programs P (thus ιEH (Φ, P )= ι
∨
EH(Φ, P )), Theorem 5.3, Propositions 6.5–6.9, the
inclusion relations between the classes of programs and FO theories, and the proper-
ties of the ≡Ex relation. Completeness (i.e., the ‘⇒’ direction) is shown analogously,
by exploiting the counterexamples in Proposition 6.10. One can verify with little
yet tedious effort that the table is complete and that no entries can be relaxed (e.g.,
using a simple logic program).
7. APPLICATION TO THE SEMANTIC WEB
The original motivation for our work was the interest of combinations of rules and
ontologies in the Semantic Web. Below we illustrate how our results may be applied
in this context. Briefly, some uses are:
—to capture the semantics of proposed combinations in a uniform language;
—to derive properties of such and other combinations;
—to design semantics for combinations, such that the ontology and rule parts are
faithfully captured, and controlling the effect of aspects like grounding and work-
ing with open vs. closed domains.
We note that, apart from an obvious relationship to the open vs. closed domain
issue, grounding rules is important from a practical perspective, since many rule
engines in use today employ grounding. In fact, powerful rule engines like smodels6,
DLV7, and clasp8, along with many others that offer stable and/or well-founded
semantics are essentially based on evaluation of ground programs. Thus, aspects
such as the invariance of a combination with respect to grounding the rules prior
to evaluation (formally captured in Definition 7.1 below) are also important from
a practical perspective.
We concentrate on two prominent Semantic Web languages, namely (i) RDF
and its extension RDF Schema (RDFS) [RDF Concepts 2004], and (ii) OWL DL
6http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/
7http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/dlv/
8http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/clasp/
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(Version 2) [OWL 2 2009]. For reasons of clarity we restrict ourselves to normal
programs.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the combinations ιχ, which are
defined as ιχ(Φ, P ) = Φ∪τχ(P ), with χ ∈ {HP ,EB ,EH }, where Φ is an FO theory
(the ontology) and P is a normal logic program.
7.1 Grounding Invariance and Closed Domains
In order to state our results for RDF and OWL concerning grounding and open vs.
closed domains, we first formally define grounding invariance and closed domain
semantics. In the following, X is a class of FO theories and Y is a class of normal
logic programs.
Definition 7.1 Grounding Invariance. A combination ιχ fulfills grounding invari-
ance (or is invariant under grounding) for X ,Y, if ιχ(Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιχ(Φ, gr(P )), for
every (Φ, P ) ∈ X × Y.
When speaking about open and closed domain semantics in the context of combina-
tions of rules and ontologies, we are interested in the effective domain of quantifica-
tion of the variables in the rules. In the open domain semantics, variables quantify
over arbitrary domains, while in the closed domain semantics variables quantify
over a fixed domain, e.g., the set of ground terms obtained from the constants and
function symbols appearing in the rules or ontologies.
Recall that, given a normal program P and a rule r ∈ P , the embedding τχ(r) is
a formula of the form (∀) br ⊃ hr.
Definition 7.2 Closed Domain. A combination ιχ is closed-domain for X ,Y if
for every (Φ, P ) ∈ X × Y and every stable expansion T of ιχ(Φ, P ) the following
property holds. For every interpretation w such that w |=ET ιχ(Φ, P ) and variable
assignment B, whenever w,B |=ET br for some rule r ∈ P , then B assigns every
variable x in r to a named individual, i.e., xB = tI , for some name t. Otherwise,
ιχ is open-domain for X ,Y.
Essentially, a combination is closed domain if rules can only be applied (i.e., the
body is satisfied in a model and variable assignment) if all variables are assigned
to named individuals.
We have that combinations involving only ground logic programs are trivially
closed-domain.
Proposition 7.3. Combinations defined as ιχ(Φ, gr(P )) are closed-domain for
every X ,Y.
Since combinations that are invariant under grounding are equivalent (with re-
spect to ground atoms) to the combination obtained by grounding the program,
grounding invariance essentially implies closed-domain. The following observations
follow straightforwardly from the definitions of the respective combinations and the
properties of autoepistemic logic.
Proposition 7.4. The combinations ιEB and ιEH are closed-domain for FO
theories and safe logic programs. The combination ιHP is open-domain already for
empty theories and positive safe normal logic programs.
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Of particular interest to combinations of rules and ontologies on the Semantic Web
are DL-safe programs [Motik et al. 2005], which yield grounding invariance (for
positive programs), thereby effectively imposing a closed-domain semantics. An
atom p(~t) is a rule atom if p appears only in P . We call the program P DL-safe, if
P is safe and every variable in every rule r of P appears in a rule atom in B+(r).
The next propositions follow straightforwardly from the proof of Proposition 6.3.
Proposition 7.5. Let Φ be a gHorn theory and P a DL-safe positive normal
program. Then, ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ιEH (Φ, P ).
Proposition 7.6. The following combinations fulfill grounding invariance:
(1 ) ιEB and ιEH for gHorn theories and safe positive normal programs;
(2 ) ιHP , ιEB , and ιEH for Horn theories and safe positive normal programs; and
(3 ) ιHP , ιEB , and ιEH for gHorn theories and DL-safe positive normal programs.
Even under DL-safety, a generalization of this result from positive to normal logic
programs fails, and the combinations ιHP , ιEB , and ιEH behave differently—this
can be shown by replacing in the proof of Proposition 6.10(4) the theory Φ with
{p(b), p(a) ⊃ q}; the program P is then DL-safe. From Theorem 6.2, we can then
conclude the following:
Proposition 7.7. The combinations ιHP , ιEB , and ιEH are not invariant under
grounding for Horn theories and DL-safe normal logic programs.
Observe that this result, combined with Proposition 7.4, shows that closed-domain
does not imply grounding invariance. In contrast, Proposition 7.3 shows that the
converse effectively holds, as long as one is interesting only in ground atoms.
A weaker notion of safety, namely weak DL-safety [Rosati 2006] (see also Sec-
tion 9.2.2) plays also an important role in the Semantic Web context, because of the
possibility to write conjunctive queries over DL ontologies. A program P is weakly
DL-safe, if it is safe and for every rule r and every variable x in r, x either appears
only in non-rule atoms in B+(r) or x appears in a rule atom in B+(r). As weak
DL-safety is stronger than ordinary safety, clearly Proposition 7.6(1) and Proposi-
tion 7.6(2) extend to weakly DL-safe programs. However, Proposition 7.6(3) does
not, and the same happens also to Proposition 7.5.
Proposition 7.8. There is a pair (Φ, P ) ∈ gHorn×snLP such that P is weakly
DL-safe and positive, ιHP (Φ, P ) 6≡Eoga ιEB (Φ, P ), and ιHP (Φ, P ) 6≡
E
oga ιEH (Φ, P ).
Proof. Consider Φ = {∃x.p(x)} and P = {q ← p(x)}: ιHP (Φ, P ) allows to
conclude q, whereas ιEB (Φ, P ) and ιEH (Φ, P ) do not.
7.2 RDF, RDF Schema, and Rules
Recall that RDF is the basic data description language of the Semantic Web, in
which atomic statements have the form triple(subject , predicate , object). RDFS
has further axioms about the meaning of certain triples; for example, that the
facts triple(a, rdfs:subClassOf, b) and triple(b, rdfs:subClassOf, c) imply triple(a,
rdfs:subClassOf, c).
As shown by de Bruijn and Heymans [2007], (finite) RDF graphs S are essentially
gHorn theories of the form Φ = {∃~x.
∧
S} ∪ Ψ, where the free variables in S are
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among ~x and Ψ is a set of function-free Horn logic formulas, which capture the
RDFS semantics [RDF Semantics 2004].
Combinations of RDF graphs with rules—e.g., the RIF RDF and OWL compat-
ibility recommendation [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] and Jena9—are common, because
of the flexibility to manipulate data that rules offer. Note that in this context it is
not possible to make a strict separation between ontology and rule predicates, as
the triple predicate is “defined” by both the ontology and the rules.
Current combinations of RDFS with rules are typically limited to positive Horn
rules—a notable exception being the work by Analyti et al. [2008]. For example, the
RIF-RDFS [RIF RDF-OWL 2009] semantics essentially defines the combination of
an RDF graph Φ and a set of positive normal rules P as the first-order logic theory
ιHP (Φ, P ) = Φ ∪ τHP (P ).10
This semantics can be straightforwardly extended to normal rules P by interpret-
ing the FO-AEL theory Φ∪ τHP (P ) using the any- or all-name semantics. Such an
extension keeps the spirit of the RIF-RDFS semantics by having an open domain,
i.e., not only the constants, but also the existentially quantified variables in the
RDF graphs matter (see also Proposition 7.4).
However, rules typically have a closed domain semantics. One may thus argue
that combinations should respect this semantics and enforce a closed domain in the
interaction between the RDF statements and the rules; examples of such combina-
tions are Φ∪ τχ(gr(P )) and Φ∪ τEH (P ): the former enforces closing of the domain
through grounding, while the latter forces closing through the use of the modal
operator L in the rules (cf. Proposition 7.3 and Proposition 7.4). Note that, by
Theorem 6.2, the embeddings τHP , τEB , and τEH may be used interchangeably in
the combination Φ∪ τχ(gr(P )) (as long as we are interested only in ground atomic
consequences), as Φ is in gHorn and gr(P ) is in gnLP . The following example
illustrates the difference between combinations with open and with closed domain
semantics, respectively.
Example 7.9. Consider the RDF graph
Φ = {∃x.triple(x, director,TheGodfather)} ∪Ψ
encoding the fact that there is a director of the film “The Godfather”. Consider also
the program P = {hasDirector (x)← triple(y, director, x)} encoding that whenever
someone directs a film, then this film has a director. We have
τHP (P ) ={∀x, y.triple(y, director, x) ⊃ hasDirector (x)} and
τEH (P ) ={∀x, y.triple(y, director, x) ∧ Ltriple(y, director, x) ⊃
hasDirector (x) ∧ LhasDirector (x)}.
Clearly, hasDirector (TheGodFather) is a consequence of Φ ∪ τHP (P ), but not of
Φ ∪ τEH (P ), as there is no constant c such that triple(c, director, TheGodFather)
is included in the single stable expansion of Φ ∪ τEH (P ).
9http://jena.sourceforge.net/
10We avoid here to go into unnecessary and tedious detail concerning the RIF-RDFS semantics
specification, which does not give further insight.
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Similarly, hasDirector (TheGodFather) is not a consequence of Φ ∪ τχ(gr(P )),
since there is no constant representing the director.
Proposition 7.6 shows that grounding P or not, prior to combination with Φ, does
not matter if Φ is an RDF graph without blank nodes (as then Φ is in Horn) and
P is positive—in particular, Φ ∪ τχ(gr(P )) ≡Eoga Φ ∪ τχ(P ). Similarly for τEB and
τEH , if Φ is an arbitrary RDF graph, and P is safe and positive. If P is moreover
DL-safe (see Section 7.1), this invariance under grounding for arbitrary RDF graphs
and safe positive programs also extends to the τHP embedding, and thus τEB , τEH ,
and τHP are all interchangeable. We furthermore have that the open and closed
domain semantics coincide in the cases mentioned in this paragraph.
If S is an RDF graph, we define ιχ(S, P ) = Φ∪ τχ(P ), where Φ = {∃~x.
∧
S}∪Ψ,
as before. An RDF graph S is ground if it does not contain free variables. Such a
graph is equivalent to the Horn theory Φ = {
∧
S} ∪Ψ. From Propositions 7.5 and
7.6 we then obtain:
Corollary 7.10. The combinations ιEB and ιEH fulfill grounding invariance
for RDF graphs and safe positive normal programs, and ιHP fulfills it for ground
RDF graphs and safe positive normal programs, as well as for RDF graphs and DL-
safe positive normal programs. Moreover, for RDF graphs Φ and DL-safe positive
normal programs P , it holds that ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ιEH (Φ, P ).
A notable further consequence of Proposition 7.6 is the following observation con-
cerning the standard RIF-RDFS semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009].
Corollary 7.11. The RIF-RDFS combination semantics fulfills grounding in-
variance for DL-safe positive normal programs.
For a possible use case scenario, suppose the ontology Φ is a ground RDF graph.
Now, suppose the user wants to add a set of DL-safe positive normal rules and fol-
low the standard RIF-RDFS combination semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009]. If the
user is interested only in ground atomic consequences, Corollary 7.11 tells us that
this semantics is invariant under grounding and thus essentially closed-domain, by
Proposition 7.3. Even when extending the graph with variables, the combination
remains invariant under grounding and thus closed-domain. However, grounding
invariance may be lost when extending the program with negation, by Proposi-
tion 7.7.
7.3 OWL DL and Rules
The Web Ontology Language OWL DL is based on Description Logics (DLs); Ver-
sion 1 [OWL Semantics 2004] is based on the DL SHOIN and Version 2 [OWL 2
2009] on the DL SROIQ. Both DLs can be viewed as subsets of first-order logic
[Sattler et al. 2003]. An influential proposal for combining OWL DL ontologies
with positive normal rules is the Semantic Web Rules Language (SWRL) [Horrocks
et al. 2004], which gives a standard first-order semantics to their union.
A SWRL theory Φ consists of a set of DL axioms and a set of Horn-like formulas.
We obtain the following correspondence with ιHP combinations.
Proposition 7.12. Let Φ be a SWRL theory. Then, there are an FO theory Φ′
and safe positive normal logic program P such that Φ |= α iff α is a consequence of
ιHP (Φ, P ), for every objective ground atom α.
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An approach similar to SWRL was adopted by the RIF working group for pos-
itive normal RIF rules [RIF RDF-OWL 2009]. If Φ is the FOL-equivalent of an
OWL DL ontology and P is a set of positive normal rules, the semantics of RIF-
OWL DL combinations is given by the FO theory ιHP (Φ, P ) = Φ ∪ τHP (P ). By
Proposition 7.12, this is equivalent to SWRL.
Regarding open versus closed domains, similar considerations as in Section 7.2
apply to combinations of OWL DL with rules: Φ∪ τHP (P ) yields an open domain,
while Φ ∪ τχ(gr(P )) and Φ ∪ τEH (P ) yield a closed domain on the rule side (see
Example 7.9). However, interchangeability and invariance of the embeddings τHP ,
τEB , and τEH under grounding may not be guaranteed, as Φ need not be in gHorn .
Example 7.13. Consider Φ = {A(a), ∀x.A(x) ⊃ B(x) ∨ C(x)}, which captures a
simple OWL DL ontology, and P = {q ← B(x); q ← C(x)}. Now,
τHP (gr(P )) = {B(a) ⊃ q, C(a) ⊃ q} and
τEH (gr(P )) = {B(a) ∧ LB(a) ⊃ q ∧ Lq, C(a) ∧ LC(a) ⊃ q ∧ Lq}.
We have that q is a consequence of Φ∪τHP (gr(P )), but not of Φ∪τEH (gr(P )), since
neither B(a) nor C(a) is included in the single stable expansion of Φ∪ τEH (gr(P )).
There are important fragments of OWL DL that are essentially included in gHorn ,
such as the OWL 2 profiles EL, QL and RL [OWL 2 Profiles 2009], and the fragment
corresponding to Horn-SHIQ [Hustadt et al. 2005]. As was the case with RDF,
when considering the combination Φ∪τχ(gr(P )) (see Propositions 7.5 and 7.6), the
embeddings τHP , τEB , and τEH may be used interchangeably, and, for safe positive
programs, τEB and τEH are invariant under grounding. Furthermore, OWL 2 RL
is essentially in Horn. Therefore, when considering combinations of OWL 2 RL
ontologies with positive normal programs, ιHP (Φ, P ), ιEB (Φ, P ), and ιEH (Φ, P )
may be used interchangeably, by Proposition 6.3, and the combinations are invariant
under grounding of the rules, by Proposition 7.6. Moreover, they are closed-domain.
As shown by Motik et al. [2005], reasoning with OWL DL plus DL-safe rules
(i.e., SWRL having DL-safe rules) is decidable. From Propositions 7.5 and 7.6, we
obtain the following corollary. Here, OWL gHorn theories are theories of OWL 2
EL, OWL 2 QL, OWL 2 RL, or Horn-SHIQ.
Corollary 7.14. The combinations ιEB and ιEH fulfill grounding invariance
for OWL gHorn theories and safe positive normal programs, and ιHP fulfills it
for OWL 2 RL theories and safe positive normal programs, as well as for OWL
gHorn theories and DL-safe positive normal programs. Moreover, if Φ is an OWL
gHorn theory and P a DL-safe positive normal program, then ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga
ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEH (Φ, P ).
Consider a scenario in which the ontology Φ is in both OWL 2 RL and OWL 2
EL and one wants to add positive rules that are safe (but not DL-safe), using the
standard RIF-OWL combination semantics [RIF RDF-OWL 2009]. Corollary 7.14
tells us that one may employ any of the considered combinations ιχ and may ground
the rules, as long as one is only interested in atomic formulas. However, if we
were to extend the ontology Φ towards full OWL 2 EL by introducing existentially
quantified variables, we may no longer use the ιEB or ιEH combinations, if we
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
32 · Jos de Bruijn et al.
want to remain faithful to the RIF-OWL combination semantics, as illustrated
by Example 7.9. In addition, we may not ground the rules prior to reasoning.
Therefore, if such a future extension towards OWL 2 EL is likely, one should choose
the ιHP embedding rather than ιEB or ιEH , and should not rely on grounding for
reasoning.
8. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss implications of the results in the previous sections. We first
discuss the implications of our results on the relationships between the embeddings,
and make a number of observations about those relationships. We then discuss
how the results in this paper can be used in the context of combining classical
theories (ontologies) with logic programs (rules). Specifically, how the embeddings
studied in this paper can be used as building blocks for such combinations. Finally,
we discuss our choice of FO-AEL as the underlying formalism, and compare the
semantics for quantification (quantifying-in) with other approaches to quantifying-
in in autoepistemic logic [Levesque 1990; Levesque and Lakemeyer 2000; Kaminski
and Rey 2002].
8.1 Relationships between the Embeddings
Using the results obtained in Sections 5 and 6, we can make a number of observa-
tions about the embeddings:
(1) The differences between the embeddings by themselves do not depend on the
use of negation in the program. Generally speaking, the differences originate from
the positive use of the modal operator in the antecedent and the consequent, and the
use of the PIA axioms. However, in combinations with FO theories, the interaction
between names in Φ for which there are no UNA axioms and negation in the rules
gives rise to different behavior of the embeddings (see Proposition 6.10(4)).
(2) The stable expansions of embeddings with and without the PIAs generally
tend to differ. However, we can note that the former are generally stronger in terms
of autoepistemic consequences (cf. Figure 1 and Example 4.14).
(3) The embeddings τHP and τ
∨
HP are generally the strongest in terms of con-
sequences (see Figure 1), when comparing to other embeddings without and with
PIAs, respectively. They allow to derive the contrapositive of rules (cf. Exam-
ple 4.2) and the bodies of rules are applicable to unnamed individuals, whereas the
antecedents of the axioms in the other embeddings are only applicable to named
individuals, because of the positive modal atoms in the bodies.
(4) For unsafe programs, the embeddings τEH and τ
∨
EH are generally not compa-
rable with the others; embeddings of unsafe rules may result in axioms of the form
∀x.Lp(x) (cf. Example 4.4), which result in all individuals being named.
(5) If names in Φ that lack UNA axioms and rules in P (e.g., Φ is propositional or
P is ground) do not interact, then τEB and τEH are in most cases interchangeable.
Special care needs to be taken if one selects an embedding that includes the PIA
axioms (i.e., τ∨HP and τ
∨
EB). These axioms of the form α ⊃ Lα ensure that α or
¬α is included in every stable expansion, for every ground atom of ΣP . Note that
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the PIA axioms have no effect when considering individuals that are not named by
ground terms in ΣP .
The UNA axioms in embeddings, which serve to make individuals different by
default, may interact with the FO theory in a combination. For example, consider
P = {p(a); p(b)} and Φ = {a 6= b ⊃ r, a 6= c ⊃ s}. Then, every stable expansion of
ιχ(Φ, P ), for any embedding τχ we considered, contains r as a 6= b is concluded by
default, but not s (as c is unknown in P ). To shortcut such (possibly undesired)
inequality transfers from P to Φ, the unique names or even the standard names
assumption may be adopted a priori. Recall that the results on the embeddings
in Section 4 were obtained by stepping through the standard names assumption,
and thus they also hold under the unique names or standard names assumption,
as shown by de Bruijn et al. [2008]. On the one hand, this should extend to the
positive results about correspondences in Sections 5 and 6, whose proofs rely on
named interpretations and no equalities between individuals are enforced. On the
other hand, some counterexamples for correspondences fail, including those for the
first item in Lemma 5.13 and Proposition 6.10(4), and thus further correspondences
may hold. An in-depth study of the effect of unique names and standard names
assumptions on the correspondences and differences between the embeddings is an
interesting subject for further work.
8.2 Different Embeddings and Combinations
Recall the general setting for combining a first-order theory Φ and a logic program
P in a unifying formalism (FO-AEL) that we sketched in the introduction. The
combination operator ι takes as arguments the theory Φ and the program P , and
returns an FO-AEL theory ι(Φ, P ). The operator provides two embedding func-
tions: σ and τ map first-order theories, respectively logic programs, to FO-AEL
theories. We also mentioned that in the simplest case the combination is the union
of the two individual embeddings: ι(Φ, P ) = σ(Φ) ∪ τ(P ).
In Section 4 we investigated several candidates for the embedding function for
logic programs, τ . All these embedding functions are faithful, in the sense that
the stable models of the program P correspond to the sets of objective ground
atomic formulas in the stable expansions of the embedding τ(P ). In Section 5 we
investigated the relationships between the stable expansions of these embeddings
when considering more general formulas. It turned out that there are already
significant differences between the expansions when considering non-ground or non-
atomic formulas.
Now, in Section 6, we investigated the relationships between the expansions when
considering combinations of the embeddings with first-order theories. We have
found that, under certain circumstances—namely, when the first-order theory and
program are of particular shapes and we are interested in a particular kind of
formulas (e.g., ground formulas)—certain embeddings can be used interchangeably
(cf. Table I). For example, if the program is normal and ground (P ∈ gnLP),
the theory is generalized Horn (Φ ∈ gHorn), and we are interested in objective
formulas, we can use the embeddings τEB and τEH interchangeably: ιEB ≡ ιEH
for P ∈ gnLP and Φ ∈ FoL, according to Table I, as Horn ⊆ FoL and the set of
objective formulas is a subset of the set of formulas.
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
34 · Jos de Bruijn et al.
Our results are not limited to combinations of the form ι(Φ, P ) = Φ ∪ τ
(∨)
χ (P ),
where τ
(∨)
χ is one of the embeddings investigated in this paper. One could imagine
adding axioms to Φ or rules to P to achieve the desired interoperation between
the two components, or even changing the axioms or rules (e.g., by grounding),
obtaining a first-order theory Φ′ and program P ′. In this more general setting, the
combination is defined as
ι(Φ, P ) = Φ′ ∪ τ (∨)χ (P
′),
where Φ′ and P ′ are obtained from Φ and P by adding and/or replacing axioms
and rules. The results of Section 6 can be applied, provided that Φ′ and P ′ are in
the respective classes of theories and programs, independent of the shapes of Φ and
P (see also Section 7).
As discussed in Section 4, embeddings that include the UNA axioms are not
modular in general, but only signature-modular. This can be remedied by instead
using the single axiom
(∀) Lx = x ∧ Ly = y ∧ ¬Lx = y ⊃ x 6= y
which has the same effect for embeddings. However, using this axiom would entail
default uniqueness on all names in a combination, not only those from the signature
of the program (if desired, such default uniqueness can be easily accomplished by
just mentioning respective terms in the logic program). As a consequence, also the
combinations behave differently.
8.3 Quantifying-in in First-Order Autoepistemic Logic
We consider here FO-AEL, with the semantics for quantifying-in as defined by
Konolige [1991], as an underlying formalism for combinations of first-order theo-
ries and logic programs. However, further semantics for quantifying-in have been
proposed in the literature.
Levesque [1990] defined the logic of only knowing (see also the subsequent work
by Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000]), which is essentially a superset of FO-AEL.
Levesque’s semantics for quantifying-in is slightly different from the one of Konolige
[1991] that we used in this paper. He adopted a standard names assumption that
amounts to a special case of the notion in Section 2.1; there is a countably infinite
number of constant symbols in the language, but there are no (other) function
symbols. Likewise, the variant of FO-AEL by Kaminski and Rey [2002] also employs
a standard names assumption, although under a somewhat different guise: the
domain of every interpretation is an extended Herbrand interpretation, i.e., it is
a superset of the set of constant symbols in the theory; function symbols are not
considered. The semantics of Konolige does not impose such restrictions, e.g.,
the domain may be infinite, while the number of constants is finite, and function
symbols are allowed.
It is well known that reasoning in standard first-order logic can be reduced to
reasoning in first-order logic with the standard names assumption, as long as there
are sufficiently many constant symbols available [Fitting 1996].
Different from Levesque [1990], Kaminski and Rey [2002] did not consider equality
in the language. However, equality in first-order logic with standard names behaves
quite differently from equality in standard first-order logic. In the latter case, two
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constant symbols may be interpreted as the same element in the domain, whereas
in the former case, all constant symbols are interpreted distinctly, e.g., a = b cannot
be satisfied if a and b are distinct constant symbols.11 It is, however, possible to
reduce reasoning in standard first-order logic with equality to reasoning in first-
order logic with standard names using a special congruence predicate [Fitting 1996,
Theorem 9.3.9]. Motik and Rosati [2007] use such a predicate in their variant of
the logic MKNF [Lifschitz 1991; 1994], as do de Bruijn et al. [2008] in a variant
of FO-AEL with standard names; see Section 9.2 for further discussion about this
work.
9. RELATED WORK
We review here two areas of related work: extensions of logic programming and
description logic semantics with open domains and nonmonotonicity, respectively,
and approaches to combining rules and ontologies.
9.1 Extensions of LP and DL Semantics
We have studied the combination of logic programs and ontologies using embeddings
in a unifying formalism (FO-AEL). One could imagine, in contrast, extensions of
the semantics of logic programs or ontologies to incorporate (parts of) the other
formalism. One such extension of logic programming semantics is that of open
domains [Gelfond and Przymusinska 1993]. Such extended semantics can be used
to accommodate incomplete knowledge, an important aspect of ontology languages.
Van Belleghem et al. [1997] define open logic programs, which are combinations of
sets of rules and first-order logic formulas; the set of predicate symbols is partitioned
into a set of open and a set of closed predicates. The semantics of the program is the
first-order theory consisting of Clark’s completion of the closed predicates and the
first-order formulas in the open program. They then discuss how description logics
can be embedded in such open logic programs and they discuss the correspondence
between abduction in open programs and reasoning in description logics.
Heymans et al. [2006] describe an extension of the stable model semantics with
open domains, called open answer set programming (OASP). They show how the
expressive DL SHIQ can be embedded in this language and Heymans et al. [2008]
show how OASP can be used for combinations of rules and ontologies, following
the DL+log semantics [Rosati 2006] (see Section 9.2).
Recently, Cal`ı et al. [2009] presented Datalog± as a language that, similarly as
OASP, can be used to enhance ontologies with rules. In essence, Datalog± amounts
to a skolemized form of gHorn in a relational setting, where for decidability rules
must satisfy a guardedness condition. As reported by Cal`ı et al., various DLs can be
encoded into Datalog±, and thus, like in OASP, combination of rules and ontologies
can be achieved by adding rules to this encoding. Furthermore, Cal`ı et al. present a
semantics for Datalog± programs with stratified negation that generalizes the usual
notion of stratified programs, which thus enables combinations with nonmonotonic
rules. An embedding of (stratified) Datalog± into FO-AEL via the embedding τHP
11Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] extend the logic of only knowing by allowing the use of constants
and function symbols different from standard names; several ground terms may be associated with
one standard name, and for any constant symbols a and b with this property, a = b is satisfied.
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seems easily possible, such that its (operational) semantics can be reconstructed
in logical terms, as well of the combination with the DLs described. Moreover,
the embedding can be used to give semantics to unstratified Datalog± programs
via FO-AEL, and the results of this paper can be exploited to derive properties.
Investigating this in detail remains for future work.
Several nonmonotonic extensions of description logics have been defined in the
literature [Baader and Hollunder 1995; Donini et al. 1998; Donini et al. 2002; Bon-
atti et al. 2006]. These might be further extended to accommodate logic programs
by well-known correspondences of the latter to nonmonotonic formalisms. In more
detail, extensions of DL semantics with defaults and circumscription have been
described by Baader and Hollunder [1995] and Bonatti et al. [2006], respectively.
Extensions with nonmonotonic modal operators, inspired by the logic MKNF [Lifs-
chitz 1991], have been described by Donini et al. [1998; 2002]. Both works mention
a notion of procedural or default rules, which are rules involving description logic
concepts. Donini et al. [1998] allow rules of the form C ⇒ D, where C and D are
DL concepts (i.e., unary predicates); such rules are intuitively read “if an individual
is proved to be an instance of C, then derive that it is also an instance of D”. The
default rules considered by Donini et al. [2002] are a generalization; they are of the
form C0, not C1, . . . , not Cn ⇒ D, n ≥ 0, where all Ci and D are DL concepts.
Intuitively, “if an individual is proved to be an instance of C0 and is not proved to
be an instance of C1, . . . , or Cn, then derive that it is also an instance of D”. The
work of Donini et al. inspired some more advanced formalisms for combining rules
and ontologies, which we consider next.
9.2 Combinations of Rules and Ontologies
Roughly speaking, we can distinguish between three kinds of combinations of rules
and ontologies: (1) uniform combinations (e.g., CARIN [Levy and Rousset 1998]
and SWRL [Horrocks et al. 2005]), (2) hybrid combinations (e.g., dl-programs [Eiter
et al. 2008] and DL+log [Rosati 2006]), and (3) embedding combinations (e.g.,
the MKNF combination by Motik and Rosati [2007] and a combination based on
quantified equilibrium logic [de Bruijn et al. 2007]); for more discussion, see, e.g.,
the works of Eiter et al. [2008] and de Bruijn et al. [2006]. We also note the recent
approach by de Bruijn et al. [2008] for embeddings of dl-programs, DL+log , and
MKNF into FO-AEL.
9.2.1 Uniform Combinations. With uniform combinations we mean combina-
tions of ontologies that are essentially classical first-order theories and of Horn
logic formulas that are essentially positive rules. The combined theory, which is
the set-theoretic union of the formulas in the ontology and the Horn formulas, is
interpreted under the standard first-order logic semantics.
In the CARIN approach [Levy and Rousset 1998], the ontologies are theories of
the description logic ALCNR and the rules are Datalog rules, i.e., safe positive
normal rules as defined in Section 2.2, with the further restriction that predicates
which occur in the ontology may not be used in rule heads. Levy and Rousset show
that reasoning with these combinations is undecidable in general, but becomes
decidable when suitably restricting either the ontology or the rules. As discussed in
Section 7, Motik et al. [2005] demonstrated decidability of SWRL—the combination
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of OWL DL with normal positive rules—restricted to DL-safe rules.
9.2.2 Hybrid Combinations. Hybrid approaches combine logic programs with
nonmonotonic negation (usually, under the stable model semantics or the well-
founded semantics) with a description logic knowledge base or, in more abstract
terms, theories in first-order logic. The two most prominent such approaches are dl-
programs [Eiter et al. 2008] andDL+log [Rosati 2006]. The main difference between
them is the way in which the interaction between the individual components (the
logic program and the ontology) is managed. For both, we assume that the ontology
component is a DL theory and the logic program is function-free and safe.
In dl-programs, the interoperation between the program and the ontology is
achieved by DL queries, which are queries to the DL ontology, in the bodies of the
rules; prior to evaluation, information from the program may be temporarily added
to the ontology for a query. Eiter et al. [2008] show that query answering in dl-
programs is decidable as long as reasoning in the individual components (ontology
and logic program) is decidable. HEX-programs [Eiter et al. 2005] generalize dl-
programs to more general external evaluations that are not limited to queries on
DL ontologies.
DL+log makes a distinction between ontology and rules predicates; rules predi-
cates may not occur in the ontology, but the ontology predicates may occur in the
rules. The combination is interpreted by a single first-order interpretation, but the
part of the interpretation concerned with the rules predicates is subject to stabil-
ity conditions corresponding to the usual definition of stable models. Thus, the
interoperation is based on single models, resulting in a broad interface between the
program and the ontology. Rosati [2005] shows that if the rules are DL-safe and
satisfiability checking in the ontology component is decidable, then reasoning with
the combination is decidable. Rosati [2006] shows that reasoning is decidable if the
problem of containment of conjunctive queries in unions of conjunctive queries is
decidable for the underlying DL, provided that the rules are weakly DL-safe; this
notion dispenses DL-safety for variables that occur only in ontology predicates in
rule bodies, which makes it possible to access unnamed individuals in rules. AL-log
[Donini et al. 1998] can be seen as a precursor of DL+log that considers only posi-
tive programs and that allows (unary) ontology predicates only in rule bodies and
effectively requires DL-safety. The differences between the underlying principles of
dl-programs and DL+log are discussed in more detail by de Bruijn et al. [2006].
Since we did not distinguish between rule and ontology predicates in our em-
beddings—indeed, in the introduction we claimed this is undesirable—there is no
straightforward correspondence between any of the embeddings we considered and
the mentioned hybrid approaches. The embeddings we considered in this paper
can be used to construct combinations that have a tight integration between the
components and that do not have a separation between ontology and rules pred-
icates. In fact, the DL+log approach can be reconstructed by an extension of
simple combinations ιχ (Φ, P ) = Φ∪P with classical interpretation axioms, which,
loosely speaking, fix the value of classical predicates for stable expansions; we refer
to de Bruijn et al. [2008] for details.
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9.2.3 Embedding Combinations. Motik and Rosati [2007] propose a combination
of DL ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs through an embedding into
the bimodal nonmonotonic logic MKNF [Lifschitz 1991], which uses the modal
operators K, which stands for “knowledge”, and not, which stands for “negation
as failure”. The variant of MKNF used by Motik and Rosati employs a standard
names assumption similar to the approach of Levesque [1990]: there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the countably many constant symbols in the language and
elements in the domains of interpretations (functions symbols are not considered).
The equality symbol of first-order logic (=) is embedded using a special binary
predicate symbol ≈ and the usual congruence axioms [Fitting 1996, Chapter 9]
are added. Logic programs are embedded into MKNF using the transformation
described by Lifschitz [1994]: a rule r of form (1) is embedded as the formula
τMKNF (r) =
∧
i Kbi ∧
∧
j not cj ⊃
∨
k Khk.
A classical theory Φ is embedded as a conjunction comprising all the formulas in
the theory, preceded by the modal operator K: σMKNF (Φ) = K(
∧
Φ). Finally,
the combination of the logic program P and the first-order theory Φ is simply
ιMKNF = τMKNF (P ) ∪ {σMKNF (Φ)}.
Comparing τMKNF to the embeddings in Section 4, we can see that it is close
in spirit to the embedding τ∨EH ; both embeddings feature modal belief operators in
front of positive atoms in both the body and the head of the rule. In fact, it turns
out that, when using a variant of FO-AEL with standard names, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the stable expansions of τ∨−EH(P ) and the MKNF
models of τMKNF (P ) (recall that τ
∨−
EH(P ) is τ
∨
EH(P ) without the UNA axioms);
however, this correspondence does not extend to combinations with FO theories,
as shown by de Bruijn et al. [2008].
Besides the obvious differences between MKNF and autoepistemic logic—illus-
trated by the differences between the τMKNF and τ
∨−
EH embedding functions—there
is a difference in the semantics for quantifying-in between the variant of MKNF used
by Motik and Rosati [2007] and Konolige’s any- and all-name semantics that we
used in this paper. Since FO-AEL permits arbitrary interpretations, we needed to
utilize UNA axioms. Motik and Rosati employ the standard names assumption and
thus do not need such axioms.
As already pointed out, de Bruijn et al. [2007] used another nonmonotonic logic
for combining ontologies and logic programs, namely quantified equilibrium logic
(QEL) [Pearce and Valverde 2005]. While FO-AEL and MKNF are nonmonotonic
modal logics, QEL is based on the nonclassical logic of here-and-there, which is an
intermediate logic between classical and intuitionistic logic. Negation in QEL is
nonmonotonic; however, by axiomatizing the law of the excluded middle (LEM)
through ∀~x(p(~x) ∨ ¬p(~x)), one can enforce that a predicate p is interpreted classi-
cally, and negation of this predicates becomes classical. Actually, de Bruijn et al.
[2007] used a slightly generalized version of QEL that does not assume uniqueness
of names and includes equality to show that the QEL theory obtained by adding
such LEM axioms to the combination ι(Φ, P ) = Φ∪P of a FO theory Φ and a logic
program P yields the DL+log semantics.
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10. CONCLUSION
We have defined various embeddings of non-ground programs into first-order au-
toepistemic logic (FO-AEL) that generalize respective embeddings of propositional
logic programs into standard AEL, and we have investigated their semantic prop-
erties. We have shown that these embeddings are faithful, in the sense that the
stable models (or answer sets) of a given non-ground logic program P are in one-
to-one correspondence to the stable expansions of the embeddings τ
(∨)
χ (P ) with
respect to objective ground atomic formulas. Furthermore, we have analyzed the
correspondences between the embeddings at more fine-grained levels, revealing their
commonalities and differences.
Our results provide a basis and a stepping stone for the more complex endeavor
to combine classical knowledge bases and non-ground logic programs in a uniform
logical formalism (which is one of the targets of the Semantic Web architecture),
namely the well-known and amply studied formalism of autoepistemic logic. Indeed,
since the combination of positive RIF rules with RDF and OWL DL [RIF RDF-
OWL 2009] corresponds to one of the combinations we studied, our results are
directly applicable to such combinations.
In this direction, we have investigated correspondences between simple combi-
nations of embeddings of logic programs with FO theories for various classes of
logic programs and FO theories. The results of our investigation provide useful
insights into the behavior of different embeddings for logic programs with respect
to a context, given by a first-order theory, and allows some conclusions about the
replaceability of one embedding by another without altering the behavior of the
combination. Based on the results in the present paper, more elaborated combina-
tions of logic programs with FO theories are investigated by de Bruijn et al. [2008],
who show how well-known approaches to combining rules and ontologies in the Se-
mantic Web context can be embedded into FO-AEL, like those of Eiter et al. [2008],
Rosati [2006], and Motik and Rosati [2007]. Notably, the DL+log approach can be
embedded into FO-AEL by adding further axioms to the simple combination that
we have considered here.
Several issues remain for future work. In the present paper, we focused on seman-
tic aspects of embeddings of logic programs, but we did not address computational
issues. Since the embeddings are easily computed, they may be exploited to es-
tablish decidable fragments of combinations of rules and ontologies, and to craft
sound (but possibly incomplete) algorithms for specific reasoning tasks for such
combinations. There are several promising starting points for devising algorithms
for computing stable expansions and/or autoepistemic consequences in FO-AEL.
Niemela¨ [1992] presents a general procedure for computing stable expansions in
FO-AEL without quantifying-in. Levesque and Lakemeyer [2000] present a sound,
but incomplete proof theory for the logic of only knowing, which extends FO-AEL
with standard names. Finally, Rosati [1999] presents techniques for reasoning with
first-order MKNF (with standard names) with a limited form of quantifying-in; the
not operator in MKNF is equivalent to ¬L in autoepistemic logic [Rosati 1997].
Other issues are extensions of the language used for logic programs. Adding
classical negation to the τEB and τEH is routine, and has been done by de Bruijn
et al. [2008] for FO-AEL with standard names. Other interesting extensions include
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nesting [Lifschitz et al. 1999], where the closeness between nesting in logic programs
and the logic MKNF suggests that an embedding is straightforward, and aggregates
[Faber et al. 2004; Ferraris 2005; Pelov et al. 2007; Son and Pontelli 2007].
Furthermore, in the present work, we considered embeddings of logic programs
interpreted under the stable model semantics, which adopts a two-valued semantics.
It would be interesting to consider also embedding of logic programs under many-
valued semantics, most importantly under the well-founded semantics [Gelder et al.
1991], which is a three-valued semantics for logic programs with negation that has
also been considered for combination of rules and ontologies [Knorr et al. 2008;
Drabent et al. 2007]. Three-valued extensions of autoepistemic logic [Denecker
et al. 2003; Bonatti 1995; Przymusinski 1991b] may be used as a starting point.
Lastly, the initial motivation for our work has been the application to Semantic
Web languages. Combinations of positive RIF rules with RDF and OWL DL ontolo-
gies, as we have discussed in the present paper, are just a first step. Nonmonotonic
extensions of RIF [Kifer 2008], and also the RDF Query Language SPARQL [2008],
are instances of the combination problems we have sketched in the present paper.
The semantics of both nonmonotonic RIF and SPARQL can be expressed in terms
of nonmonotonic logic programs [Kifer 2008; Angles and Gutierrez 2008; Polleres
2007], but their combination with OWL ontologies is still an open issue on W3C’s
agenda in completing the Semantic Web architecture [Bratt 2007]. We expect that
our results can be used to provide valuable insights towards the definition of a uni-
fying logic encompassing the Semantic Web Ontology (OWL, RDFS), Rules (RIF)
and Query languages (SPARQL).
A. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF SECTIONS 5 AND 6
This appendix contains the remaining proofs of the results stated in Sections 5
and 6. We remind the reader that we omit the superscript X from |=X, ≡Xγ , Cn
X,
stableX, etc. if the stated property holds regardless of whether X = E or X = A.
Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Let T be a stable expansion of τEB (P ) or τEH (P )
(resp., of τ∨HP (P ) or τ
∨
EB(P )). We only consider Toga in the following; so, by
Theorem 5.3, the choice between τEB and τEH (resp., τ
∨
HP and τ
∨
EB) is immaterial.
Define
Γτ = {φ ∈ Lg | τ(P ) |=Toga φ}, τ ∈ {τEB , τEH , τ
∨
HP , τ
∨
EB}.
By Proposition 3.4, τ(P ) has a stable expansion T τ such that Γτ = T τog.
First we will show that T τEBog = T
τEH
og by establishing
T τog = {φ ∈ Lg | Toga |= φ}. (2)
T τEBog = T
τEH
og follows from this claim, thereby establishing the first part of the
proposition, concerning the embeddings τEB and τEH .
Every entailed objective ground formula is equivalent to a conjunction of ground
clauses c = l1 ∨ · · · ∨ lk, where each li is either an atom pi or a negated atom ¬pi.
Clearly, Toga |= c iff li ∈ Toga for some li in c. To prove (2), clearly T τog ⊇ {φ ∈ Lg |
Toga |= φ}. For the other inclusion, suppose that τ(P ) |=Toga c (hence c ∈ T
τ
og), but
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Toga 6|= c. Hence, li /∈ Toga for every li in c. Consider an arbitrary interpretation w
such that w |=Toga τ(P ); then, w |=Toga c. Let w
′ result from w by flipping the truth
value of the atom pi of each literal li in c such that w |=Toga li; clearly, w
′ 6|=Toga c.
We now show that w′ |=Toga τ(P ); this contradicts the assumption τ(P ) |=Toga c
and proves (2).
Let α ∈ τ(P ) be an instance of an axiom that originates from a rule in P .
We show that w′ |=Toga α. Suppose first that some flipped atom pi occurs in
the antecedent αa of α. If w
′ |=Toga ¬pi, then clearly w
′ |=Toga α. Otherwise,
w |=Toga ¬pi and thus Lpi, which also occurs in the antecedent of α, is false in
w′. Hence, w′ |=Toga α. Suppose then that α has no flipped pi in αa, and that
w′ 6|=Toga α. Hence, w
′ |=Toga αa and w
′ |=Toga ¬pi for some flipped pi that occurs
in the consequent of α. As w |=Toga αa, it follows pi ∈ Toga ; as li /∈ Toga , we have
li = ¬pi and thus w |=Toga ¬pi, which implies w
′ 6|=Toga ¬pi by definition; this is a
contradiction. This proves w′ |=Toga α.
As unique names axioms in τ(P ) are clearly satisfied in w′, w′ |=Toga τ(P ), thereby
establishing the claim (2) and thus the first part of the proposition.
For the second part concerning τ∨HP (P ) and τ
∨
EB(P ), we exploit the PIA axioms:
thanks to them each objective ground atom α or its negation ¬α is included in the
stable expansion T τ , for τ ∈ {τ∨HP , τ
∨
EB}. Thus, T
τ
og = {φ ∈ Lg | Toga |= φ} (by
structural induction), from which T
τ∨HP
og = T
τ∨EB
og follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Let T be a stable expansion of τEB (P ) (resp.,
τEH (P )). By Theorem 5.3, we know that
τEB (P ) ≡oga τEH (P ), (3)
hence, Toga = T
′
oga for some stable expansion T
′ of τEH (P ) (resp., τEB (P )).
We proceed as follows. We first claim that (†) given a safe program P and an
interpretation w, one can construct a named interpretation w′ such that w |=Toga
τ(P ) iff w′ |=Toga τ(P ), where τ ∈ {τEB , τEH }. It follows that, for every formula φ,
τ(P ) |=Toga φ iff for every named interpretation w,
w |=Toga τ(P ) implies w |=Toga φ (4)
We denote the latter—i.e., entailment restricted to named interpretations—with
the symbol |=NToga .
We then claim that (‡) for every formula φ ∈ LL, τEB (P ) |=NToga φ iff τEH (P ) |=
N
Toga
φ; combined with (3) and (4), this establishes τEB (P ) ≡ τEH (P ). We now proceed
to prove the individual claims (†) and (‡).
(†) Let w = 〈U, ·I〉 be an interpretation. Let the named interpretation wN =
〈UN , ·I
N
〉 be as follows: UN = {tI | t ∈ N}; for every n-ary predicate symbol
p, pI
N
= pI ∩ (UN )n; and for every n-ary function symbol f and ~k ∈ (UN )n,
f I
N
(~k) = f I(~k).
Consider τEB (P ), which contains two kinds of formulas: UNA axioms and axioms
of the form (∀)
∧
(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
¬Lcj ⊃ h. The former are obviously satisfied in
〈wN , Toga〉 iff they are satisfied in 〈w, Toga〉, because they are variable-free. Consider
an open formula α =
∧
(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
¬Lcj ⊃ h and a variable assignment B of w.
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Since P is safe, every variable in α occurs in some bi. Therefore, if B assigns
any variable in α to an unnamed individual, (w,B) 6|=Toga Lbi; hence (w,B) |=Toga
α. If B assigns all variables in α to named individuals, then (w,B) |=Toga α iff
(wN , B) |=Toga α, by construction of w
N . The proof for the case of τEH (P ) is
analogous; the antecedents of the implications in τEB (P ) and τEH (P ) are the same.
This proves the claim (†).
It remains to prove (‡). Let T be a stable expansion of τEB (P ).
(⇒) By the shape of the formulas in τEB (P ) and τEH (P ), for every interpretation w
clearly w |=NToga τEH (P ) implies w |=
N
Toga
τEB (P ). Hence, for every formula φ ∈ LL
it holds that τEB (P ) |=NToga φ implies τEH (P ) |=
N
Toga
φ.
(⇐) We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that τEH (P ) |=NToga φ, but τEB (P ) 6|=
N
Toga
φ. Hence there must be a named interpretation w such that w |=Toga τEB (P ) and
w 6|=Toga φ. We will show that w |=Toga τEH (P ), which contradicts the assumption.
The UNA axioms in τEH (P ) are obviously satisfied in w, since they are also
in τEB (P ). Consider a formula (∀)α ⊃ h ∧ Lh ∈ τEH (P ) that is not satisfied in
〈w, Toga〉, where α =
∧
(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
¬Lcj . Since w |=Toga (∀)α ⊃ h ∈ τEB (P ),
we have that, for some variable assignment B, (w,B) |=Toga α and (w,B) 6|=
E
Toga
Lh
(resp., (w,B) 6|=AToga Lh); hence, hβ /∈ Toga for all (resp., for some) name substitu-
tion(s) β associated with B. However, since (w,B) |=Toga α, and thus (w,B) |=
E
Toga
Lbi and (w,B) 6|=EToga Lcj (resp., (w,B) |=
A
Toga
Lbi and (w,B) 6|=AToga Lcj), it follows
that biβbi ∈ Toga and cjβcj /∈ Toga
12 for some/all (resp., for all/some) name substi-
tutions βbi , βcj associated with B. Now, since T is a stable expansion of τEB (P ),
from (4) and the UNA axioms contained in τEB (P ) it follows that hβ ∈ Toga
for some (resp., for all) name substitution(s) β associated with B. Therefore,
w |=Toga (∀)α ⊃ h∧Lh and w |=Toga τEH (P ), establishing the desired contradiction.
This proves that τEH (P ) |=NToga φ implies τEB (P ) |=
N
Toga
φ.
The case of T being a stable expansion of τEH (P ) is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 5.9. By the PIA axioms bi ⊃ Lbi we can eliminate the
modal atoms of the form Lbi from the antecedents of the axioms in τ
∨
EB(P ) that
originate from rules in P . The remaining theory is the same as τ∨HP (P ) and thus
the stable expansions correspond.
Proof of Proposition 5.10. As τEB (P ) and τEH (P ) differ only in that the
latter has a conjunction h1∧Lh1 in the consequent of embedded rules τEH (r) while
the former simply has h1, the first implication is immediate. The second implication
is argued similarly; each τEB (r) has a stronger antecedent than τHP (r).
Proof of Proposition 5.11. Similarly as τ∨EB(P ) and τ
∨
HP (P ) in Proposition
5.10, τ∨EB(P ) and τ
∨
HP (P ) only differ in that the embedding τ
∨
EB(r) of each rule
r has a stronger antecedent than the corresponding τ∨HP (P ), from which the first
part follows.
For the second part, as in Proposition 5.6 it suffices to consider the case of
named individuals. Consider any interpretation 〈w, T 〉 such that w is named and
12Observe that biβbi and cjβcj are well-defined, because all individuals in w are named.
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w |=T τ∨EB(P ). By the PIA axioms, for every variable assignment B, associated
name substitution β, and a∈Loga , we have that (w,B) |=T a implies w |=T Laβ.
Hence, w |=T τ∨EH(P ).
Proof of Lemma 5.12. Recall that a formula φ ∈ LL is an autoepistemic con-
sequence of a theory Φ ⊆ LL if φ is included in every stable expansion of Φ. Recall
also that, by Theorem 5.3, the stable expansions of all embeddings τ
(∨)
χ (P ) corre-
spond with respect to Loga . From this and the fact that, by Proposition 3.4, every
stable expansion T is determined by Toga and τ
(∨)
χ (P ), we can conclude C
(∨)
χ ⊆ C
(∨)
γ
if w |=Toga τ
(∨)
γ (P ) implies w |=Toga τ
(∨)
χ (P ) for every interpretation 〈w, Toga〉.
—CEH −→ C∨EH , C
∨
EH −→ CEH : follow from the fact that, if P ∈ nLP , τEH (P )
and τ∨EH(P ) coincide.
—CEH 99K CEB: follows from Proposition 5.6.
—CEB −→ CEH , CEB → CHP : follows from Proposition 5.10.
—CHP −→ C∨HP , CEB → C
∨
EB : if P ∈ nLP , then clearly τHP (P ) ⊆ τ
∨
HP (P ), so
w |=Toga τ
∨
HP (P ) implies w |=Toga τHP (P ). Likewise for τEB (P ) and τ
∨
EB(P ).
—C∨EB −→ C
∨
HP : C
∨
EB ⊆ C
∨
HP follows from Proposition 5.11.
—C∨EH 99K C
∨
EB: follows from Proposition 5.11.
Proof of Lemma 5.13.
—C∨EH 6⊆ C
∨
HP : Consider P = {p(x); q(c) | c ∈ N}, which is not safe. Then
τ∨EH(P ) has a single stable expansion T , and since ∀x.p(x) ∧ Lp(x) is in T , in
every model of T all individuals must be named. Hence T , and thus C∨EH ,
contains ∀x.q(x). Also τ∨HP (P ) has a single stable expansion, but individuals
may be unnamed in its models, and so ∀x.q(x) /∈ C∨HP holds.
—C∨EB 6⊆ CHP : Consider P = {b ← a}, which is clearly safe. Then τ
∨
EB(P ) has
a single stable expansion, and a /∈ T , which implies ¬La ∈ T . As T contains
the contrapositive ¬La ⊃ ¬a of the PIA axiom a ⊃ La, T contains also ¬a.
Consequently, ¬a ∈ C∨EB. Since τHP (P ) contains no PIA axioms, ¬a 6∈ CHP .
—CHP 6⊆ C∨EB : Consider the safe program P = {q(x) ← p(x)}. The single stable
expansion of τHP (P ) contains ∀x(p(x) ⊃ q(x)), while the single stable expansion
of τ∨EB(P ) does not. Hence, ∀x(p(x) ⊃ q(x)) ∈ CHP , but ∀x(p(x) ⊃ q(x)) 6∈ C
∨
EB .
Proofs of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.3. We reduce the first part of the proposition to the
second part through skolemization.
Let P ∈ snLP , Φ ∈ gHorn and let Σ = ΣΦ ∪ΣP be the combined signature. To
ease argumentation, we use a fresh unary predicate d as a domain predicate in P :
let P ′ result from P by adding for each variable x occurring in rule r ∈ P the atom
d(x) to the body of r, and let Φ′ = Φ ∪ {d(t) | t ∈ NΣ}.
As an easy lemma, the stable expansions of ιχ (Φ, P ) and ιχ(Φ
′, P ′) (χ ∈ {EB,
EH}) correspond and agree on formulas in L = LΣ. Indeed, as every rule r ∈ P is
safe, every variable x in τχ(r) occurs in a positive modal atom Lbi in the antecedent;
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thus, given a model 〈w, T 〉 of ιχ (Φ, P ) and a variable assignment B, (w,B) |=EΓ Lbi
holds only if xB is a named individual, and thus (w′, B) |= d(x), where w′ is
obtained from w by setting the extension of d to the set of named individuals. On
the other hand, as d occurs in ιχ(Φ
′, P ′) only in facts and positively in antecedents
of embedded rules τχ(r), we can, in every model 〈w, T 〉 of ιχ(Φ′, P ′), decrease the
extension of d to the set of named individuals without compromising satisfaction.
It follows that if T is a stable expansion of ιχ(Φ, P ), then there exists a stable
expansion S of ιχ(Φ
′, P ′) such that Soga = Toga ∪ {d(t) | t ∈ NΣ}, and vice versa.
Now let Φ′′ be a skolemization of Φ′, let Σ′ (resp., Σ′′) be the combined signature
of P ′ and Φ′ (resp., P ′ and Φ′′), and let L′ (resp., L′′) be the resulting FO language.
We now establish correspondence between the stable expansions of ∆′ = ιχ(Φ
′, P ′)
and ∆′′ = ιχ(Φ
′′, P ′) with respect to L′ga . As (Φ
′′, P ′) ∈ Horn×nLP and P ′ is
positive, the first part of the proposition then follows from second.
(⇐) Let T ′′ be a stable expansion of ∆′′. We note an important fact: (†) d(t′) ∈
T ′′ such that t′ /∈ NΣ′ (i.e., t′ is a Skolem term) implies that t = t′ ∈ T ′′ for some
t ∈ NΣ′ (as d occurs in ∆′′ only in ground facts and in antecedents of embedded
rules). We show that, for every α ∈ L′ga , it holds that ∆
′ |=ET ′′oga α iff α ∈ T
′′
oga (i.e.,
∆′′ |=ET ′′oga α); by Proposition 3.4 this proves that there is a stable expansion T
′ of
∆′ such that T ′oga = T
′′ ∩ L′ga .
Suppose first that w |=ET ′′oga ∆
′ ∪ {¬α}. Then we can extend w by suitable in-
terpreting the Skolem functions, thereby obtaining some w′ such that w′ |= Φ′′.
Clearly, w′ |=ET ′′oga UNAΣP . Now suppose that for some variable assignment B and
some variable x that occurs in τχ(r) (r ∈ P ′), (w′, B) |=ET ′′oga Ld(x). Then, by (†),
xB is named by some t ∈ NΣ′ and hence (w,B) |=ET ′′oga Ld(x) and the antecedent of
τχ(r) is satisfied by 〈w, T ′′oga〉 with respect to B. It follows that w
′ |=ET ′′oga τχ(r) and
thus w′ |=ET ′′oga ∆
′′ ∪ {¬α}.
Conversely, suppose w′ |=ET ′′oga ∆
′′ ∪ {¬α}. Let w be the restriction of w′ to Σ′.
Then clearly w |=ET ′′oga Φ ∪ UNAΣP . Furthermore, if (w,B) |=
E
T ′′oga
Ld(x) for some
variable x that occurs in τχ(r), then (w
′, B) |=ET ′′oga Ld(x); as w
′ |=ET ′′oga τχ(r), it
follows that w |=ET ′′oga τχ(r). Hence, w |=
E
T ′′oga
∆′ ∪ {¬α}.
(⇒) Now let T ′ be a stable expansion of ∆′. We show that ∆′′ has a stable
expansion T ′′ such that T ′oga = T
′′ ∩ L′ga . Let Γ be the smallest set Γ ⊆ L
′′
ga such
that (a) T ′oga ⊆ Γ and (b) ∆
′′ |=EΓ Γ; the set Γ exists since ∆
′′ |=ET ′oga β for each
β ∈ T ′oga and ∆
′′ |=ES β implies ∆
′′ |=ES′ β for each β ∈ L
′′
oga and S ⊆ S
′ ⊆ L′′oga .
Hence, ∆′′ has a stable expansion T ′′ such that T ′′oga = Γ. As T
′
oga ⊆ Γ, it remains
to show that Γ ∩ L′ga ⊆ T
′
oga .
We can obtain Γ as Γ =
⋃
i≥0 Γ
i, where Γ0 = T ′oga and Γ
i+1 = {α ∈ L′′ga | ∆
′′ |=EΓi
α}, i ≥ 0; furthermore, d(t′) ∈ Γi implies that t = t′ ∈ Γi for some t′ ∈ NΣ′ by
induction on i ≥ 0 (note that Φ is Horn). Now let i be the least index such that
Γi+1 ∩ L′ga 6⊆ T
′
oga . Hence, ∆
′′ |=EΓi α for some α ∈ L
′
ga \ Γ
i, and for each model
(w,Γi) of ∆′′ there is some variable assignment B and axiom τχ(r) ∈ ∆′′ such
that (w,B) |=EΓi b ∧ Lb for each b in the antecedent of τχ(r), in particular for each
d(x), and τχ(r) has consequent h such that α = hβ for some name substitution β
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associated with B. From minimality of i and safety of r, we may assume that β has
only names from NΣ′ . But then ∆′ |=ET ′oga τχ(r) implies that α ∈ T
′
oga , which is a
contradiction. Hence Γi+1∩L′ga ⊆ T
′
oga holds for all i ≥ 0 and thus Γ∩L
′
ga ⊆ T
′
oga .
For the second part, we show that for any stable expansion T of ∆χ = ιχ(Φ, P ),
χ∈{HP ,EB,EH}, there exists a stable expansion T ′ of ∆′χ = ιχ(Φ, grL(P )) such
that T ′oga=Toga, and vice versa. The result then follows by Propositions 6.7 and 6.5.
In what follows, let ΣP be the signature of P , let Σ be the combined signature
of Φ and P , and let ∆(
′)χ[ΣP ] (resp., ∆
(′)χ[Σ]) result from ∆(
′)χ by removing the
UNAΣP axioms and adding, for each a, b ∈ NΣP (resp., a, b ∈ NΣ), the atom a= b
if a= b ∈ T and the negated atom ¬(a= b) if a= b /∈ T .
For the case x = HP , we note that ∆HP [ΣP ] and ∆HP [Σ] are classical FO Horn
theories. Let α ∈ Lga . Given that T is a stable expansion of ∆HP , Proposition 3.4
implies α ∈ Toga iff (a) ∆HP |=EToga α; the latter is equivalent to (b) ∆HP [ΣP ] |=
E
Toga
α. By well-known minimal model properties of Horn theories (cf. Lemma A.1), (b)
iff (c) ∆HP [Σ] |=EToga α; furthermore, if we replace all embedded rules τHP (r), r∈P ,
in ∆HP [Σ] with their groundings with respect to NΣ, we obtain ∆′HP [Σ], and we
that (c) iff (d) ∆′HP [Σ] |=
E
Toga
α. The latter is clearly equivalent to ∆′HP |=
E
Toga
α,
which implies that ∆′HP has some stable expansion T
′ such that Toga = T
′
oga . The
converse direction is argued similarly.
In the cases χ = EB and χ = EH , ∆
(′)
χ [ΣP ] and ∆
(′)
χ [Σ] are not classical FO
Horn theories. However, we can turn them into such theories: for each modal atom
Lp(~x) in a rule, we view Lp as a fresh classical predicate, and add, for each ground
atomic formula α with predicate p, the formula Lα to Φ if α ∈ T and we add the
negated atom ¬Lα to Φ if α /∈ T . One can then straightforwardly verify that, for
any α ∈ Lga, the resulting theory entails α iff the original theory entails α with
respect to T , i.e., if Ψ is the original theory, Ψ |=ET α. The argument then proceeds
analogously to the case x = HP .
Proof of Proposition 6.5. We show that, given an FO interpretation w and
a stable expansion T of ιχ (Φ, P ), with χ ∈ {EB,EH}, w |=ET ιEB (Φ, P ) iff w |=
E
T
ιEH (Φ, P ). Recall that ιEB (Φ, P ) and ιEH (Φ, P ) only differ in embedding of rules
r from P , which are mapped to τEB (r) = α ⊃ h in ιEB (Φ, P ) and to
τEH (r) = α ⊃ (h ∧ Lh) (5)
in ιEH (Φ, P ), where α =
∧
(bi ∧ Lbi) ∧
∧
¬Lcj . Consider first χ = EB.
(⇐) Clearly, every model of ιEH (Φ, P ) is a model of ιEB (Φ, P ).
(⇒) Suppose w |=ET ιEB (Φ, P ). Consider an axiom (5) such that (w,B) |=
E
T α.
It follows that bi ∈ T and cj 6∈ T , and, since α ⊃ h is in ιEB (Φ, P ) and T is
a stable expansion thereof (and consequently closed under first-order entailment),
that h ∈ T . This proves w |=ET ιEH (Φ, P ).
The case χ = EH , i.e., T is a stable expansion of ιEH (Φ, P ), is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6.6. Follows from the proof of Proposition 5.9.
Proof of Proposition 6.7. We first prove the result for Φ ∈ Horn, and then
extend the result to Φ ∈ gHorn . We use the following Lemma.
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Lemma A.1. Let J be a (countable) index set, let wj = 〈Uj , ·Ij 〉, for j ∈ J , be
models of an FO theory Φ in which all individuals are named, and let w = 〈U, ·I〉
be the “intersection” of all wj, defined as follows:
—U = {[tI1 , . . . , tIj , . . .] | t ∈ N} (recall that N is a set of ground terms);
—for n-ary function symbols f , f I(u1, . . . , un) = [v1, . . . , vj , . . .] such that vj =
f Ij (u1,j , . . . , un,j), for all j ∈ J , and ui = [ui,1, . . . , ui,j, . . .], for i = 1, . . . , n;
—for n-ary predicate symbols p, 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ pI iff 〈u1,j , . . . , un,j〉 ∈ pIj , for all
j ∈ J , where ui = [ui,1, . . . , ui,j , . . .], for i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, if Φ is Horn, w is a model of Φ.
This lemma generalizes the well-known intersection property of Herbrand models
of Horn theories. Observe that for ground terms t, t′ ∈ N we have w |= t = t′ iff
wj |= t = t′ for every j ∈ J .
To show that ι∨HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ι
∨
EH(Φ, P ), it is by Proposition 3.4 sufficient to
show that given any stable expansion T of (1) ι∨EH(Φ, P ), resp. (2) ι
∨
HP (Φ, P ), for
each α ∈ Lga it holds that ι∨HP (Φ, P ) |=
E
T α iff ι
∨
EH(Φ, P ) |=
E
T α. We leave out the
parameters (Φ, P ) in the remainder.
The if direction always holds, as every model 〈w, T 〉 of ι∨HP is also a model of ι
∨
EH :
both theories contain Φ and the same UNA axioms; by the PIA axioms we have that
(∗) for any ground atom α occurring in P , w |= α iff α ∈ T and, consequently, for
every rule r (which must be ground, as P is ground), w |=ET τ
∨
HP (r) iff w |=
E
T τ
∨
EH(r).
Thus, it remains to consider the only-if direction.
Case 1. Let T be a stable expansion of ι∨EH . Suppose ι
∨
HP |=
E
T α, but ι
∨
EH 6|=T α.
Let {αj | j ∈ J} = {α′ ∈ Lga | ι∨EH 6|=T α
′} and let for each αj , wj be an
interpretation such that wj |=ET ι
∨
EH ∪ {¬αj}; such a wj must exist and, without
loss of generality, wj has only named individuals (as ι
∨
EH is a universal theory).
Note that α = αj for some index j ∈ J .
Let w∗ be the “intersection” of all wj , constructed as in Lemma A.1. We first
establish w∗ |=ET ι
∨
EH : by the lemma, w
∗ |=ET Φ; w
∗ does not satisfy equalities that
are not satisfied by the wj , satisfaction of the UNA axioms follows; finally, 〈w∗, T 〉
does not satisfy antecedents of any τ∨EH(r), for r ∈ P , that are not satisfied by
some 〈wj , T 〉, and so w∗ |=ET τ
∨
EH(r).
We now establish w∗ |=ET ι
∨
HP . As T is a stable expansion of ι
∨
EH , every α
′ ∈ Lga
such that α′ ∈ T is satisfied in w∗. The PIA axioms (α′ ⊃ Lα′) are satisfied: if
α′ /∈ T (i.e., Lα′ is false), then α′ is false in w∗, as for each α′ /∈ T , there is a wj
such that wj 6|= α′. Satisfaction of the rule embeddings τ∨EH(r) follows by the same
argument as in the if direction. Therefore, w∗ |=ET ι
∨
HP . However, as α = αj for
some j, w∗ 6|= α. This implies ι∨HP 6|=T α, a contradiction.
Case 2. Let T be a stable expansion of ι∨HP . Suppose again that ι
∨
HP |=
E
T α,
but ι∨EH 6|=
E
T α. Hence there is some model 〈w
′, T 〉 of ι∨EH ∪ {¬α} such that
w′ is named. As w′ 6|=T ι∨HP must hold, the difference of ι
∨
HP and ι
∨
EH (which
is only in rule embeddings) together with groundness of P implies that α must
occur in some rule head of P . Let 〈w′′, T 〉 be a model of ι∨HP such that w
′′ is
named. Such a model must exist: if ι∨HP would have no such model, then Lga ⊆ T
would hold as T is a stable expansion of ι∨HP . As P is ground, we can replace
all non-negated modal atoms in PIA axioms and in rule embeddings τ∨EH (r) with
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⊤. Modulo simplifications, we then obtain ι∨HP . But then w
′ |=ET ι
∨
HP , which is a
contradiction.
Let w be the “intersection” of w′ and w′′ as in Lemma A.1. We claim that w |=ET
ι∨HP : 〈w, T 〉 satisfies Φ, the UNA, and the PIA axioms by arguments analogous to
Case 1. Satisfaction of the rule embeddings τ∨HP (r) follows from Property (∗).
For establishing ιHP (Φ, P ) = ιEH (Φ, P ) for P ∈ gnLP , the argument is similar but
slightly diverging, as there are no PIA axioms. Even if Property (∗) does not hold,
in (2) some w′′ exists such that 〈w′′, T 〉 satisfies
∧
i bi ∧ Lhi, resp. hk′ ∧ Lhk′ , in an
embedded rule τEH (r) iff w
′′ |=
∧
i bi, resp. w
′′ |= hk′ , as EH is, modulo modal
atoms Lα—which can be eliminated from it, see below—, an FO Horn theory, and
so Lemma A.1 applies.
This proves the result for Φ ∈ Horn. To generalize it to Φ ∈ gHorn , we exploit
standard skolemization [Fitting 1996], by which we obtain from Φ an equi-satisfiable
FO Horn theory Φ′. We show that skolemization of Φ commutes with its combina-
tion with the ground program P .
In detail, as already shown, ι∨EH(Φ
′, P ) ≡Eoga ι
∨
HP (Φ
′, P ) and ιEH (Φ
′, P ) ≡Eoga
ιHP (Φ
′, P ) hold. Thus it remains to show for each χ ∈ {∨HP ,
∨
EH ,HP ,EH} that for
every stable expansion T of ιχ(Φ, P ) ⊆ LL, there exists some stable expansion T ′
of ιχ(Φ′, P ) ⊆ L′
L
such that T ∩ Lga = T
′ ∩ Lga, and vice versa.
We transform ιχ(Φ, P ) to an FO theory Jχ(T ) as follows: we replace each modal
atom Lα in ιχ(Φ, P ) with ⊤ if α ∈ T , and with ⊥ if α /∈ T . Intuitively, in Jχ(T )
we fix the value of Lα according to T . Since P is ground, Jχ(T ) is then indeed an
FO theory. Clearly, for every α ∈ Lga, ιχ(Φ, P ) |=ET α iff Jχ(T ) |= α.
We construct J ′χ(T ) from ιχ(Φ
′, P ) in the same way, and obtain that for every α ∈
Lga, ιχ(Φ′, P ) |=ET α iff J
′
χ(T ) |= α. Now observe that J
′
χ(T ) is a skolemization of
Jχ(T ), and thus equi-satisfiable; the same holds for Jχ(T )∪{¬α} and J ′χ(T )∪{¬α},
for arbitrary α ∈ Lga, and thus Jχ(T ) |= α iff J ′χ(T ) |= α; equivalently,
ιχ(Φ, P ) |=EToga α iff ιχ(Φ
′, P ) |=EToga α.
From Proposition 3.4, we can conclude that ιχ(Φ′, P ) has some stable expansion
T ′ such that Toga = T
′ ∩ Lga. (Note that T ′ might contain objective ground
atoms that are not in Toga , due to the Skolem functions.) The converse is obtained
analogously.
Proof of Proposition 6.8. Follows from the proof of Proposition 5.5 and the
fact that there is a PIA axiom for each propositional symbol that occurs in any
formula in τ∨HP (P ) or τ
∨
EB(P ).
Proof of Proposition 6.9. To show the first part, let T be a stable expansion
of ιEB (Φ, P ). We show that for every φ ∈ Lg, ιEB (Φ, P ) |=ET φ iff ιEH (Φ, P ) |=
E
T φ.
(⇒) Trivial, as every model of ιEH (Φ, P ) is a model of ιEB (Φ, P ) (see also Propo-
sition 5.10).
(⇐) Let φ ∈ Lg. Suppose ιEH (Φ, P ) |=ET φ, but ιEB (Φ, P ) 6|=T φ, and so there is
a w = 〈U, ·I〉 such that w |=ET ιEB (Φ, P ) and w 6|=T φ. Without loss of generality,
we may assume that w is named by straightforward adaptation of Lemma 4.5; note
that individuals do not affect satisfaction of propositional formulas, and unnamed
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
48 · Jos de Bruijn et al.
individuals to not affect satisfaction of ground formulas. By analogous argument to
the proof of the if part of (‡) in Proposition 5.6, we can conclude w |=ET ιEH (Φ, P ),
a contradiction.
The case of T being a stable expansion of ιEH (Φ, P ) is analogous. The proof of the
second part is obtained from the proof of Proposition 5.6 by replacing τχ(P ) with
ιχ(Φ, P ) and the observation that the domain of interpretation U has no bearing
on the satisfaction of propositional formulas.
Proof of Proposition 6.10.
(1): Consider the program P = {r ← p; r ← q; s ← s} and the theory Φ =
{p ∨ q,¬s ⊃ t}. The combinations ιχ(Φ, P ), with χ ∈ {HP ,EB,
∨
HP ,
∨
EH}, all have
one stable expansion Tχ. Now THP contains r while TEB does not, due to the
modal operators in the antecedents in τEB (P ). We have that s is not included
in any Tχ. So, by the PIA axioms, ¬s and, consequently, t are included in T∨HP .
Neither is included in THP or T
∨
EH .
(2): Consider P = {q ← p}. The stable expansions of both ιHP (∅, P ) and
ι∨HP (∅, P ) contain p ⊃ q, whereas the expansions of ιEB (∅, P ) and ι
∨
EH(∅, P ) do not;
see also Example 4.2. In addition, ¬p and ¬q are in the expansion of ι∨HP (∅, P ),
due to the PIA axioms, but not in the expansions of ιHP (∅, P ) or ι∨EH(∅, P ).
(3): Consider P = {p(a); q(x)← p(x)}. The single expansion of τ∨HP (P ) contains
∀x.p(x) ⊃ q(x), whereas the expansion of τ∨EB(P ) does not.
(4): Consider P = {q′ ← r(x), not p(x); s ← q; s ← q′; r(a)} and the theory
Φ = {p(a), p(b) ⊃ q, r(b)}. We have
ιHP (Φ, P ) = {p(a), r(b), r(a),
p(b) ⊃ q, q ⊃ s, q′ ⊃ s,
∀x.r(x) ∧ ¬Lp(x) ⊃ q′}.
A given model 〈w, T 〉 of τHP (P ) either satisfies a = b or a 6= b—τHP (P ) does not
include UNA axioms involving b. In the former case, p(b), and thus q and s, must
be satisfied. In the latter case, assuming that p(a) ∈ T and p(b) /∈ T , Lp(x) is not
satisfied in case x is assigned to the individual denoted by b. Consequently, q′ and
s are satisfied. One can then verify that the single consistent stable expansion T of
ιHP (Φ, P ) is such that Toga = {r(a), r(b), p(a), s}.
The combination ιEB (Φ, P ) is like ιHP (Φ, P ), except that the axioms for s are:
Lq ∧ q ⊃ s, Lq′ ∧ q′ ⊃ s.
The single stable expansion of ιEB (Φ, P ) does not contain s, as neither q nor
q′ can be derived. So, q, q′ 6∈ T , and thus s cannot be derived. This disproves
ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEB (Φ, P ).
Consider the axiom corresponding to the first rule in P in ιEH (Φ, P ):
∀x.Lr(x) ∧ r(x) ∧ ¬Lp(x) ⊃ Lq′ ∧ q′.
Let T ′ be a stable expansion of ιEH (Φ, P ) such that q
′, p(b) /∈ T ′; clearly, r(b), p(a) ∈
T ′. Consequently, Lr(x) ∧ r(x) ∧ ¬Lp(x) is not satisfied in any model 〈w, T ′〉 for
any variable assignment B. Consider B such that xB = bw. Clearly, (w,B) |=ET ′
Lr(x)∧r(x), and thus it must be the case that (w,B) |=ET ′ Lp(x). Since p(b) /∈ T
′, it
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must be the case that w |= a = b. But then, ιEH (Φ, P ) |=ET ′ a = b, and so p(b) ∈ T
′,
a contradiction. As the expansions of ιEB (Φ, P ) and ιHP (Φ, P ) contain neither q
′
nor p(b), this disproves ιHP (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιEH (Φ, P ) and ιEB (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ιEH (Φ, P ).
The combinations ι∨HP (Φ, P ) and ι
∨
EB (Φ, P ) both have a stable expansion that
contains q′ and not q or p(b): since q is not in the expansion, ¬q, and also ¬p(b),
must be satisfied in every model, by the PIA axioms. Consequently, every model
must satisfy a 6= b and thus also q′ and s, which are hence included in the expansion.
This disproves ιχ(Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ιξ(Φ, P ) for (χ, ξ) = (HP ,
∨
HP ), (HP ,
∨
EB), (EB,
∨
EB),
and (EB ,
∨
HP ).
Consider the following modification of (Φ, P ): in Φ replace q with q(b) and in
P replace q and q′ with q(x) and q′(x). Observe that the embeddings τ∨EB(P )
and τ∨HP (P ) do not contain PIA axioms involving q(b) or q
′(b). By an argument
analogous to the case of ιHP and ιEB , we obtain that s is included in the single stable
expansion of ι∨HP (Φ, P ), but not in the single expansion of ι
∨
EB (Φ, P ) and that
neither expansion contains q′(b) or p(b). This disproves ι∨HP (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ι
∨
EB(Φ, P ).
One can then argue, analogously to the case of the original combination above,
that there is no stable expansion T of ιEH (Φ, P ) that contains neither q
′(b) nor
p(b). This disproves ιEH (Φ, P ) ≡Eoga ι
∨
EB(Φ, P ) and ιEH (Φ, P ) ≡
E
oga ι
∨
HP (Φ, P ).
(5): Reconsider P = {p(a); p(x); q(x)← p(x)} following Proposition 5.6.
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